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INTRODUCTION
It is interesting to note that the property protected in the
copyright system are works of authorship, defined within eight
illustrative categories as: literary works; musical works; dramatic
works; pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial, graphic
and sculptural works; motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
sound recordings; and architectural works in § 102 of the
Copyright Act,1 and yet, authorship as a creative human endeavor
has received very little attention as a legal concept that may aid
jurists and policy makers in setting an acceptable balance between
private property rights and public interests in literary and artistic
works as the protected subject matter of copyright law. This
Article argues that understanding the notion of creative authorship
as a unique, yet fundamentally intrinsic, human expression will
assist copyright policy makers and judges in reaching policy and
legal decisions that reflect more accurately the realities of creating
literary and artistic works. Here, this Article makes a call for a
clear demarcation between authorial rights in literary and artistic
works, and the economic rights to print, publish and distribute
these works.
A good place to start thinking about authorial rights in literary
and artistic works is to identify the role of the author within the
copyright system. This Article argues that contrary to scholarly
literature that contends the role of the romantic author in the
copyright system is antiquated and is an inaccurate depiction of the
actual process of creativity, the notion of the romantic author is
actually the most important concept in copyright to assist in fairly
1
17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2006) [hereinafter The Copyright Act]; id. § 102 (providing
eight illustrative categories of works of authorship).
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allocating rights and entitlements in literary and artistic works.
When we think of the reverence society gives William
Shakespeare as an author and playwright, what we really see is the
special connection that an author has with his audience, or readers,
and in Shakespeare’s case, this author–reader connection is second
to none. Shakespeare has had, and continues to have, an immense
influence on his audiences and readers. Harold Bloom refers to
him as “the most influential of all authors during the last four
centuries.”2 In his account of Shakespeare as a poet, Ralph Waldo
Emerson acknowledges the weight of Shakespeare’s words and
likens him to “some saint whose history is to be rendered into all
languages . . . .”3 An author’s connection with his or her audience
transcends the boundaries of society, time and culture, and
Shakespeare’s influence through his work is but one illustration of
the role authors have in society and human life. The way in which
Shakespeare’s work and life has molded society’s literary and
artistic development and cultural formation as a poet and
playwright in seventeenth-century Elizabethan England and as a
present-day author who speaks with a contemporary voice that
resonates with our present and future times4 suggests that there is
more to the notion of the creative individual and authorship as an
essentially human activity than that which is presently
acknowledged within the copyright system.
Shakespeare, who lived from 1564 to 1616,5 wrote and
published his works from 1593 to 1609,6 well before the Statute of
Anne was passed by Parliament in 1710 to recognize literary rights
in manuscripts.7 The patronage system, wherein authors wrote for
2

HAROLD BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE: A THEORY OF POETRY xiii (2d ed.
1997) [hereinafter BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE].
3
Id. at xvi (“[H]e is like some saint whose history is to be rendered into all languages,
into verse and prose, into songs and pictures, and cut up into proverbs; so that the
occasion which gave the saint’s meaning the form of a conversation, or of a prayer, or of
a code of laws, is immaterial, compared with the universality of its application.”).
4
See NORTHROP FRYE, NORTHROP FRYE ON SHAKESPEARE 1 (Robert Sandler ed.,
1986).
5
See id.
6
HAROLD BLOOM, GENIUS: A MOSAIC OF ONE HUNDRED EXEMPLARY CREATIVE
MINDS 16–18 (Warner Books 2002) [hereinafter BLOOM, GENIUS].
7
The Statute of Anne was an “Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the
Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of Such Copies, during the Times
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an aristocratic class for financial reward, public recognition and
protection, was the prevalent method by which authors earned their
dues.8 Shakespeare, as most playwright authors did in his time,
depended on this system for his livelihood.9 Authors provided a
service to their patrons and were rewarded or punished by what
their works did for their audiences.10 What authors received from
their patrons was a reward or honor for their service and work, and
the idea that authors could own their literary and artistic creations
through property rights did not fit well with the traditional
patronage system.11
Shakespeare was a talented dramatist12 and left such a
pronounced mark on literature that his work continues to speak to
society with a voice that is still powerful four hundred years
therein mentioned.” Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1709, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
The Statute of Anne benefited authors to the extent that it allowed authors to acquire the
copyright in their work that before the statute was the sole prerogative of publishers and
members of the Stationers’ Company, the London publishing guild. See LYMAN RAY
PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 145 (Vanderbilt Univ. Press 1968)
[hereinafter PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT].
8
HAROLD BLOOM, THE WESTERN CANON: BOOKS AND SCHOOL OF THE AGES 43
(Riverhead Books 1994) [hereinafter BLOOM, THE WESTERN CANON].
9
Two of Shakespeare’s early poems, Venus and Adonis and The Rape of Lucrece,
were dedicated to his patron, the Earl of Southampton. See BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF
INFLUENCE, supra note 2, at xx. An outbreak of plague in 1593 or 1594 forced theaters to
close, and Shakespeare was forced to earn his living through other means. See FRYE,
supra note 4, at 10.
10
Texts were thought to be an action (as opposed to a thing) that would cause
reactions in those who came in contact with them:
[Texts might] ennoble or immortalize worthy patrons . . . move
audiences to laughter or tears . . . expose corruption or confirm the
just rule of the monarch or assist in the embracing of true religion, in
which case their authors were worthy of reward . . . [or] move men to
“sedition and disobedience” or to “detestable heresies” in which case
their authors deserved punishment.
MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 13 (Harvard Univ.
Press 1993).
11
Id. at 17.
12
See BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE, supra note 2, at xvi. Emerson describes
Shakespeare as
a full man, who liked to talk; a brain exhaling thoughts and images,
which seeking vent, found the drama next at hand. Had he been less,
we should have had to consider how well he filled his place, how
good a dramatist he was—and he is the best in the world.
Id.
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later.13 Being in the patronage system and producing plays, poems
and sonnets for his patrons, however, had a significant impact on
what he wrote and produced. Shakespeare was popular and well
liked14 but probably refrained from venturing into contemporary
politics in his works because of censorship15 and the need to court
favors from patrons.16 Although Harold Bloom suggests that
Shakespeare’s works resulted from his independent individuality
and remarkable intellect17 and were not shaped by state power or
fidelity to his patron,18 the influence that patrons would have had

13

See id. at xiii.
FRYE, supra note 4, at 9 (“Shakespeare seems to have been popular and well liked
both as a person and as a dramatist. He never engaged in personal feuds, as many of his
contemporaries did, and his instinct for keeping out of trouble was very agile.”).
15
See id. (noting that any play containing references to contemporary politics would
not be staged).
16
See id. at 10 (“Shakespeare seems to have had the instincts of a born courtier:
Macbeth, for example, would have been just right for James I, who had come to London
from Scotland a few years earlier.”).
17
Harold Bloom, in defining “genius,” refers to Shakespeare several times. See, e.g.,
BLOOM, GENIUS, supra note 6, at 9–11. Bloom quoted Thomas Carlyle, the Scottish
essayist, satirist and historian during the Victorian era, as having remarked, “[i]f called to
define Shakespeare’s faculty, I should say superiority of intellect.” Id. at 9. Bloom also
quotes William Blake as stating “[t]he ages are always equal but genius is always above
its age.” Id. at 10. Bloom goes on to state that “[w]e cannot confront the twenty-first
century without expecting that it too will give us a Stravinsky, or Louis Armstrong, a
Picasso or Matisse, a Proust or James Joyce. To hope for a Dante or Shakespeare, a J.S.
Bach or Mozart, a Michelangelo or Leonardo, is to ask for too much, since gifts that
enormous are very rare.” Id.
18
Some scholars of literary study argue that the social order of the English
Renaissance period reduced playwrights of that period to time-servers or subverters of
state power. See BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE, supra note 2, at xvi–xvii. Harold
Bloom, arguing against this position, emphasizes the influence Shakespeare had in his
era:
Who wrote the text of modern life, Shakespeare or the Elizabethan–
Jacobean political establishment? Who invented the human, as we
know it, Shakespeare or the court and its ministers? Who influenced
Shakespeare’s actual text more, William Cecil, Lord Burghley, the
First Secretary to Her Majesty, or Christopher Marlowe? . . . [W]e
need to assert that high literature is exactly that, an aesthetic
achievement, and not state propaganda, even if literature can be used,
has been used, and doubtless will be used to serve the interests of a
state, or of a social class, or of a religion, or of men against women,
whites against blacks, Westerners against Easterners.
Id. at xvii.
14
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as the masters or employers of authors19 on the kind of works their
authors produced would be difficult, if not impossible, to ignore.20
Sir Thomas Babbington Macaulay was quick to recognize the
detrimental effect of patronage upon literary and artistic creations.
In his 1841 parliamentary speech opposing the extension of the
then copyright term of twenty-eight years, he remarked that he
could conceive of no system more fatal to the
integrity and independence of literary men than one
under which they should be thought to look for their
daily bread to the favour of ministers and nobles. I
can conceive no system more certain to turn those
minds which are formed by nature to the blessings
and ornaments of our species into public scandals
and pests.21
In his speech, Macaulay goes on to acknowledge the copyright
system as the “only one resource left” to ensure authors continue to
19
Jane Bernstein, in writing on print culture and music in sixteenth-century Venice,
identified patronage to fall into three distinct categories. JANE BERNSTEIN, PRINT CULTURE
AND MUSIC IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY VENICE 105–06 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001). The first
and most traditional was one of service to the patron for payment to have a composer’s
work printed. Id. The second was a dedication of a work to a potential patron with whom
a composer was seeking employment. Id. The third form of patronage moved towards a
market system where a composer completed a work and sought a patron to dedicate the
work to in return for payment or favors. Id.
20
Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J.
283 (1996) [hereinafter Netanel, Copyright] (“[I]n a world with neither copyright nor
massive state subsidy, authors would likely rely heavily on private patronage, forcing
them to cater to the tastes, interests, and political agenda of the wealthy, rather than
seeking a broader, more varied consumer audience. Copyright thus serves to support a
robust, pluralist, and independent sector devoted to the creation and dissemination of
works of authorship.”); see also Paul Goldstein, Copyright, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
79, 83 (1992) (“Patronage supports only those authors whose creative efforts meet the
patron’s taste. Patronage depresses authorship by shutting the author off from the wider
audience that he might hope to reach.”); Alan C. Hutchinson, From Cultural
Construction to Historical Deconstruction, 94 YALE L.J. 209, 223 (1984) (reviewing
JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND
RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY (1984)) (“With the
advent of commercial printing and the relative demise of the patronage system, the
literary community burgeoned . . . .”).
21
Sir Thomas Babington Macaulay, Speech Delivered in the House of Commons (Feb.
5, 1841), in FOUNDATIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 310 (Robert Merges & Jane
Ginsburg eds., 2004).
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produce literary and artistic works and are remunerated through the
rights that copyright provides.22
While the creation of the market for literary and artistic works
through the copyright system may be the best way to remunerate
authors for their creativity, the statutory scheme providing property
rights on utilitarian ideals to meet a larger social goal—that of
promoting “the Progress of Science and useful Arts”23—removes
from contemporary copyright jurisprudence the moral and ethical
considerations necessary to create the ideal conditions for authentic
authorship to occur and connect authors with society.24 Ronald
Dworkin, in Law’s Empire, argues that understanding a legal
system is a matter of making the best interpretative sense of it.25
Law and its practice, to Professor Dworkin, ought to be construed
as a general principle of political integrity that comprises various
social constraints to create equality and provide moral justification
22

Id.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
24
One area of moral and ethical norms that has not been fully explored in copyright is
the idea that the fundamental human rights of an author ought to be considered as natural
rights. See generally Orit Fischman Afori, Human Rights and Copyright: The
Introduction of Natural Law Considerations into American Copyright Law, 14 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 497 (2004). Digital media today also facilitates
authorship by authors, who write and collaborate for personal, social, moral or other
forms of non-economic rewards that are not a part of the utilitarian calculus for
copyright. See Erez Rueveni, Authorship in the Age of the Conducer, 54 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y U.S.A. 285, 288 (2007). The present copyright regime also focuses on the external
commercial value of a work and its dissemination to the widest portion of society without
much consideration of the intrinsic processes of artistic creation and inspiration. See
generally Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension
of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945 (2006).
25
According to Professor Dworkin:
General theories of law . . . must be abstract because they aim to
interpret the main point and structure of legal practice, not some
particular part or department of it. But for all their abstraction, they
are constructive interpretations: they try to show legal practice as a
whole in its best light, to achieve equilibrium between legal practice
as they find it and the best justification of that practice. . . . Legal
philosophers debate about the general part, the interpretive
foundation any legal argument must have . . . . Any practical legal
argument, no matter how detailed and limited assumes the kind of
abstract foundation jurisprudence offers, and when rival foundations
compete, a legal argument assumes one and rejects others.
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 90 (Fontana Press 1986).
23
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for its political power.26 Conceiving the copyright system as a
policy of the legislature for economic regulation27 gives rise to the
need to calibrate the extent of authorial rights against the social
costs of property rights28 to ensure that the rights provided to
authors are not more than is necessary to provide the incentive to
create.29 The difficulty of calibrating costs against benefits
26

One of the main tenets of law as integrity is that it “supposes that law’s constraints
benefit society not just by providing predictability or procedural fairness, or in some
other instrumental way, but by securing a kind of equality among citizens that makes
their community more genuine and improves its moral justification for exercising the
political power it does.” Id. at 95–96.
27
Thomas Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 272, 278 (2004) (stating that Congress’s Intellectual Property Power is not limited
by any general norm and that the exclusive rights provided under copyright law were
another form of economic regulation that Congress used to confer economic rent on
favored special interests); see also PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT, supra note 7, 143 (stating
that the first copyright statute, the Statute of Anne, was not meant to benefit authors, but
was a trade-regulation statute enacted to resolve chaos in the book trade caused by the
final lapse in 1694 of its predecessor, the Licensing Act of 1662, and to prevent a
continuation of the booksellers’ monopoly); Chris Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright,
57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 533 (2004) (“American copyright law has been set on a utilitarian
foundation . . . [that] constructs copyright as a creature of positive law, by which
exclusive rights (limited, in their application, by the express constraints set out in the
Intellectual Property Clause) may be offered, or withheld, on whatever basis is rationally
calculated to benefit the public.”).
28
According to Nachbar:
The set of rights conferred by intellectual property law is,
economically, no different than the set of rents resulting from other
limits on competition. Both forms of intervention in markets provide
a set of protections calibrated by both the definition of the market
they regulate and the scope of their restrictions on free competition to
provide particular beneficiaries the power to extract from the market
more than they could get without the limiting regulation.
Nachbar, supra note 27, at 355.
29
Robert A. Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright Theory, 43
UCLA L. REV. 1, 8 (1995) (“The goals of encouraging the creation and dissemination of
new works require a carefully balanced set of rights given to authors and privileges
granted to users of copyrighted works. It must give authors an incentive to create, but it
must also limit this incentive so that other authors can create new works that build on
original works.”). The balance between private incentives and public access is a difficult
one to draw from a utilitarian standpoint. Professor Mark A. Lemley states:
Proliferation of economic literature on intellectual property over the
last two decades has improved our understanding of the economics of
innovation and intellectual property considerably, but it has not given
us a magic bullet or told us where to draw the line between protection
and the public domain. . . . The optimal scope, strength, and duration
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inherent in any utilitarian system of rights,30 the uneasy application
of property rights in creative works to create an artificial scarcity
in public goods,31 and the reliance on an imperfect market to
allocate creative resources efficiently32 characterize a utilitarianbased conceptualization of the copyright system that justifies the

of intellectual property protection depend on the type of creation at
issue, on the nature of innovation in the particular industry in
question, on the particular kind of invention (and inventor) at issue,
and on the market context.
Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031,
1066 (2005) [hereinafter Lemley, Property]. Professor Christopher S. Yoo states that the
“[b]asic principles of welfare maximization require that works be priced at marginal cost
because it is at that point that the social benefits of producing an incremental unit no
longer exceed the social costs.” Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product
Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212, 227 (2004) (footnote omitted).
30
There is some difficulty encountered in utilitarianism, which is to balance the
collective welfare of society against the property rights of authors (creating social costs
that society bears for the grant of these rights). Professor Dworkin states:
Utilitarian arguments encounter a special difficulty that ideal
arguments do not. What is meant by average or collective welfare?
How can the welfare of an individual be measured, even in principle,
and how can gains in the welfare of different individuals be added
and then compared with losses, so as to justify the claim that gains
outweigh losses overall?
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 232 (Gerald Duckworth & Co. 1991).
Using an example of the effect segregation has on welfare, Dworkin states, “[t]he
utilitarian argument that segregation improves average welfare presupposes that such
calculations can be made. But how?” Id.; see also Lemley, Property, supra note 29, at
1066 (“[I]t is hard—and perhaps even impossible—to ever calibrate intellectual property
law perfectly.”).
31
See Maureen Ryan, Fair Use and Academic Expression: Rhetoric, Reality and
Restriction on Academic Freedom, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 541, 546–47 (1999)
(“Because an author can prevent free riders from copying and distributing an author’s
work without paying copyright royalties, copyright protection creates an artificial scarcity
in the means of accessing a creative work and gives the copyright owner a monopoly in
the resulting market for such access.” (footnotes omitted)).
32
See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1613
(1982) [hereinafter Gordon, Fair Use] (“Copyright markets will not, however, always
function adequately. Though the copyright law has provided a means for excluding
nonpurchasers and thus has attempted to cure the public goods problem, and though it has
provided mechanisms to facilitate consensual transfers, at times bargaining may be
exceedingly expensive or it may be impractical to obtain enforcement against
nonpurchasers, or other market flaws might preclude achievement of desirable
consensual exchanges. In those cases, the market cannot be relied on to mediate public
interests in dissemination and private interests in remuneration.” (footnote omitted)).
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grant of private rights in terms of common good.33 Utilitarianism
as a basis for copyright jurisprudence, directed towards the
ultimate goal of promoting “the Progress of Science and useful
Arts”34 for welfare maximization, however, creates an uncertainty
as to the proper allocation of entitlements in literary and artistic
works. The law, as it presently stands, allows authors to recover
the cost of investment in creative production from commercial
markets without any limitations or restraints on the exercise of
rights. Authors may seek as much financial remuneration for their
works through the market for as long as is necessary to provide an
economic incentive for authors to create and produce works.35 The
difficulty in identifying the precise point at which entitlements
should be extended to facilitate an author’s recovery of market
profits as an incentive to create works for the general public
benefit36 creates a legal system that subjects rights to collective

33

See Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The Relation Between Classical
Contract Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 IOWA L. REV. 769, 798–99 (1985)
(“Utilitarianism is a consequentialist or teleological theory, while libertarianism and
contractarianism are deontological theories. The primary difference between these two
types of ethical theories is that in consequentialist theories rights must always be justified
in terms of the good, while in deontological theories, at least some rights require no
justification and may be exercised regardless of their consequences.” (footnotes
omitted)).
34
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
35
Ryan, supra note 31, at 545 (“Incentive theory assumes that creative expression will
likely be squelched and constricted if authors are not afforded some copyright protection
to ensure a financial return on the costs of creating and disseminating their original
works.”); see also Yoo, supra note 29, at 215. Yoo argues that without rights over
creative works, third parties will be able to copy and distribute works without incurring
the first-copy cost borne by authors and will thereby “deprive authors of any reasonable
prospect of recovering their fixed-cost investments and would thus leave rational authors
with no economic incentive to invest in the production of creative works.” Id. The result
of this situation is an economic inefficiency resulting from monopolistic pricing practices
as authors price their works at a substantially higher price than their marginal cost of
production. See William Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1659, 1700–03 (1988).
36
For literature on this point, see as examples Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for
Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 133 (1999) (“[A] loss of social welfare [from
copyright] is acceptable up to the point required to induce creation of the work, but not
beyond.”); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV.
1197, 1205 (1996) (“[C]opyright protection beyond that necessary to compensate the
author for lost opportunities would generate no additional incentive to create and would
discourage production of additional copies . . . .”); Yoo, supra note 29, at 216–17

VOL19_BOOK2_NG

2/26/2009 3:27:18 AM

2009] ALLOCATING ENTITLEMENTS IN THE COPYRIGHT SYSTEM

423

social welfare but which, concurrently, provides very little
certainty and order in a legal system designed to allocate property
rights in literary and artistic works. The copyright system was
established as a legal institution to provide authors with the
freedom to produce works of authorship independent of nobility
and state government patronage.37 Yet, ironically, the copyright
system produces a new form of patronage—that of the market—
which now subjects authors to commercial forces as their new
patron.
A legal system that is intended to provide authors with the
freedom to create that is independent of patronage would best
serve its intended purpose by creating the ideal environment that
would allow authorship to flourish for society’s benefit. Professor
Paul Goldstein had earlier conceived of the copyright system as
concerned solely with authorship, and not the protection of authors
or publishers, nor the security of author or consumer welfare, the
bolstering of international trade balances or the protection of art.38
The law is indeed, as Professor Goldstein succinctly explained,
about “sustaining the conditions of creativity that enable an
individual to craft out of thin air, an intense, devouring labor, an
Appalachian Spring, a Sun Also Rises, a Citizen Kane,”39 for
unless the law creates an environment that would encourage
authors to create works of authorship that is independent of
extrinsic forces and influences, society may not have access to
works that are crafted from an author’s individual and autonomous
creativity.

(“[C]opyright protection must exist, but should be calibrated to the lowest level that still
provides sufficient return to support creation of a work.”).
37
According to Martha Woodmansee, the English romantic poet William Wordsworth
believed:
The [Copyright] Bill has for its main object, to relieve men of letters
from the thralldom of being forced to court the living generation, to
aid them in rising above degraded taste and slavish prejudice, and to
encourage them to rely upon their own impulses, or to leave them
with less excuse if they should fail to do so.
MARTHA WOODMANSEE, THE AUTHOR, ART AND THE MARKET: REREADING THE HISTORY
OF AESTHETICS 145 (Columbia Univ. Press 1994).
38
Goldstein, supra note 20, at 302.
39
Id.
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Fitting copyright law within the framework of utilitarianism
may overemphasize the role of the market as an institution to
provide economic rewards for authorial labor.40 Utilitarianism
undermines or ignores other non-economic conditions necessary
for creative and authentic authorship, such as the ability of authors
to use creative resources with ease or engage in collaborative
authorship.41 True authorship in an authentic sense that is
independent of government subsidies, patrons and the market is
essentially an activity that can only occur when other individuals
(authors, readers and publishers) within society are constrained by
particular moral and ethical norms based on an underlying social
agreement that provides for the entitlement of rights in creative
works on ideas of justice and fairness. Shifting the ethics for
copyright from a utilitarian-based approach, which justifies
property rights as necessary to further larger public goals, towards

40

See Dale A. Nance, Owning Ideas, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757, 764–65 (1990)
(defining the copyright system as comprising both utilitarian and teleological ideas as
distinct from one another); Samuel E. Trosow, The Illusive Search for Justificatory
Theories: Copyright, Commodification and Capital, 16 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 217, 226–27
(2003) (describing the economic model for copyright protection developed by William
Landes and Richard Posner, as a “modern variant of utilitarianism,” in which protection
furthers “the efficient allocation of resources in a market setting”). To Professor Nance,
utilitarianism measures common good by the satisfaction of human preferences without
judgment on the appropriateness of the preferences. Nance, supra, at 764. The
“measurement is done . . . by allowing aggregate preferences to be registered by the
operation of the market . . . by the demand that is revealed” in the market. Id. at 764–65.
Professor Nance contrasts teleological theories on the basis that judgments are made on
the appropriateness of the common good and states that “[i]n the context of intellectual
property, this would translate into an argument based on the intrinsic values of
knowledge and aesthetic experience, values deserving governmental support despite,
indeed because of, the insufficiency of consumer demand, even in a well-functioning
market.” Id. at 765. Other scholars treat utilitarianism as a branch of teleological thought.
See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Concept of Property in Private and Constitutional
Law: The Ideology of the Scientific Turn in Legal Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1545,
1552 (1982) (citing utilitarianism as a popular theory among teleological scholars); Kurt
M. Saunders, The Law and Ethics of Trade Secrets: A Case Study, 42 CAL. W. L. REV.
209, 232 (2006) (“Utilitarianism is the most well-known teleological or consequentialist
theory of ethical justification.”); Thomas M. Scanlon, Rawls’ Theory of Justice, 121 U.
PA. L. REV. 1020, 1047 (1973) (citing utilitarianism as the “principal example” of
teleological theories).
41
Thierry Joffrain, Deriving a (Moral) Right for Creators, 36 TEX. INT’L L.J. 735, 781
(2001) (“[M]ore than profit drives the creative process . . . . The driving force behind
creativity may be connected to the ‘intrinsic motivation’ of creators.” (footnote omitted)).
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a natural rights framework, which justifies the grant of rights as
natural entitlements, allows authorial and social rights in literary
and artistic works to be allocated on principles of fairness and
justice. A conceptualization of the copyright system based on
natural rights principles rewards authors for their individual
creativity rather than mere production or economic investment and
allows creative authorship to occur without relying on the
commercial market as an institution to allocate entitlements
between authors and society in the copyright system.
This Article is divided into three parts. Part I of this Article
argues that romanticism as a notion of authorship within the
copyright system provides an important analytical tool to assess
the role of authors within society and facilitate our understanding
of the process of creative authorship. This part of the Article
suggests that literary studies on romantic authorship minimize the
central role of authors in the copyright system and identifies the
need for a comprehensive understanding of authorial rights vis-àvis readers and publishers/distributors in the copyright system.
Part II builds an ethics for the copyright system on principles of
natural law and natural rights that is distinct from utilitarianism.
The main consideration of this part of the Article is the
acknowledgement that authors and society have natural rights in
literary and artistic works, which consequently imposes moral
obligations on authors and their readers on how these works may
be used. The use of a deontological framework to guide moral and
ethical considerations within the copyright system affects the areas
of property rights and access, the alienability of these rights,
society’s right to pursue knowledge and excellence, and the moral
rights of authors. This part of the Article provides a detailed
analysis for a copyright ethics that grants rights in creative works
as natural rights of the author that preclude the necessity of
drawing references to a larger social or political goal. Part III
considers the essence of the social contract theory as a basis to
allocate rights and entitlements in creative works within society
and calls for the judiciary to play a greater role in setting these
rights and entitlements to ensure justice and fairness. This part of
the Article also calls for limitations and restraints on the exercise
of these rights and for entitlements based on contractarianism as
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espoused by traditional and more contemporary social contract
philosophers. The Article concludes that conceiving copyright
ethics based on natural law and natural rights produces a dynamic
in the legal system that facilitates a fairer distribution of rights and
entitlements in creative works among all the parties in the
copyright system. If the aim of the copyright system is to
encourage authentic authorship that is independent of patronage by
the commercial market, a shift in copyright ethics must occur to
grant rights and entitlements as a fundamental and natural right of
the author and to impose simultaneous moral obligations on
authors to make their works available to society in accordance with
the social agreement an author has with other members of society.
I. CONTEXTUALIZING AUTHORSHIP
In contextualizing authorship within the copyright system, the
notion of the romantic author immediately comes to the forefront
of scholarly debate as a notion that is socially constructed as a
response to the emerging copyright markets of the early sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, and is often dismissed by copyright and
literary studies scholars as an unrealistic representation of how
authors truly create. Romanticism as a literary, artistic and
intellectual movement that emphasizes the individual as a creator,
who produces creative works from intrinsic human emotion,
imagination and thought,42 does however show us how authors as
individuals relate and respond to market and commercial forces
and teaches an important lesson—that there are a great number of
works of creative authorship that are not produced for the
commercial market but which have met great social and readership
success. John Milton’s contract for the first publication of
Paradise Lost provided for a mere payment of £5.00 (five pounds)
for the publisher’s right to “have hold and enjoy” the manuscript

42

See Ben Depoorter, The Several Lives of Mickey Mouse: The Expanding Boundaries
of Intellectual Property Law, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, 25 (2004) (“[The flair of romanticism
is] related to the individual’s ability and talent to create intellectual goods from
scratch.”).
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without interference from the author.43 The publisher, Samuel
Simmons, required the assurance that Milton, as the author, would
not “print or cause to be printed or sell dispose or publish the said
Booke or Manuscript or any other Booke or Manuscript of the
same tenor or subject.”44 When the contract was signed in 1667,45
authorship was subject to the control of the state through
censorship laws governing the printing of books through licenses.46
In this time, when Charles II returned to the monarchy following
the English Civil War and the rule of Oliver Cromwell, the
Licensing Act of 1662 regulated the works of authorship that could
be printed in order to prevent the printing of “Seditious,
Treasonable and Unlicensed Books and Pamphlets” and for the
“Regulating of Printing and Printing Presses” as a measure for
safeguarding the government.47 Authorship was controlled by the
authorities, and it was several years before a license to print
Paradise Lost was granted.48 Paradise Lost established Milton as
“one of the very greatest poets of the modern world.”49 To
Professor Harold Bloom, Milton, “so palpable a genius that it can
seem redundant to characterize his gift,”50 authored a
“magnificent” poem and epic in Paradise Lost.51 Yet Milton,
writing before romanticism as an intellectual movement took off in
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, wrote to express
his internal turmoil as a blind man who, in prison, faced the death
43
Milton’s Agreement With Mr. Symons for Paradise Lost (Apr. 27, 1667), in 1 THE
POETICAL WORKS OF JOHN MILTON 283 (Samuel Egerton Brydges ed., John Macrone
1835); ROSE, supra note 10, at 27.
44
ROSE, supra note 10, at 27.
45
Id.
46
Censorship in England was through copyright. By granting the Stationers’
Company, the trade guild comprising bookbinders, booksellers and printers, with the
right to suppress the printing of prohibited books, the government maintained control of
the printing presses. PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT, supra note 7, at 114–42.
47
Id. at 134.
48
The authorities were suspicious of John Milton, who had worked for Cromwell’s
revolutionary government, and who was also excluded from general amnesty when the
restoration of the monarchy occurred following the fall of Cromwell’s government.
Harold Bloom, Introduction to JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST xxi–xxvi (Gordon Teskey,
ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 2005) (1667).
49
Id. at xxvii.
50
BLOOM, GENIUS, supra note 6, at 50.
51
Id. at 52.
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penalty following the fall of Cromwell’s government,52 and
produced a work of literary and poetic greatness that made a
significant impact upon society and those who read it. Yet,
Paradise Lost was a work that was not influenced by the
possibility of market commercialization.
Authorship in this context therefore places the author in a
unique position as the creator and producer of literary and artistic
works in the center of the copyright legal system comprising
authors, readers and the publisher/distributor. Before a work is put
before the public, an author must conceive of a work and engage in
an intricate process of creativity to produce the work. The
composition of Paradise Lost as a creative endeavor occurred
independently of the reading public, who largely regarded Milton
as a criminal and one guilty of sedition,53 of financial rewards from
publication and distribution of the book54 or of government
patronage or control of the work.55 Milton’s authoring of Paradise
Lost occurred within a set of circumstances so unique to his
individual situation56 that the form of authorship can be regarded
52

See id.
John Milton was thought to be a “political controversialist, as a
disestablishmentarian (someone who opposes an ‘established’ state-run church), as an
enemy of bishops and of hireling priests (ministers paid for their work), as a proponent of
divorce, as a defender of regicide, and as the chief propagandist under the dictatorship of
Oliver Cromwell”—in short, as a vigorous proponent of everything, so that after 1660, he
was regarded by many in England as criminal and seditious. MILTON, supra note 48, at
xxvii.
54
Authorial rights over the literary and artistic works were not formed at this point,
and the market for books was controlled by booksellers and publishers rather than
authors. ROSE, supra note 10, at 28.
55
The composition of Paradise Lost occurred between the start of the downfall of
Cromwell’s reformation government around 1658 and the restoration of the English
monarchy to Charles II. MILTON, supra note 48, at xxiii–xxv.
56
Paradise Lost was written in part during the fall of Cromwell’s government. Id.
Nine of the men who signed Charles I’s execution were themselves executed. Id. Sir
Henry Vane the Younger, to whom Milton addressed a sonnet in 1652, was also
executed. Id. Milton was not among those who were formally excluded from the Act of
Pardon and could come out of hiding but was later arrested and imprisoned. Id. Milton’s
“feelings in this period, which reveal his resolution as an artist and a prophet, are
recorded in verses from the invocation to Book Seven (lines 24–28) of Paradise Lost.”
Id. at xxv; see BLOOM, GENIUS, supra note 6, at 51 (“In 1660, with the Stuart Restoration
in progress . . . [Milton] went deep into internal exile by composing Paradise Lost.
Contemplating when young, a Puritan triumph in England, Milton said of the hymns and
hallelujahs of the saints, ‘some one may perhaps be heard offering at high strains in new
53
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as an intrinsic expression of his own artistic soul in his literary
work and, to borrow Milton’s own words in his speech opposing
the licensing of the printing of books,57 as a manifestation of his
“precious life-blood . . . embalmed and treasured up on purpose to
a life beyond life.”58 Professor Roberta Rosenthal Kwall refers to
this form of authorship as a manifestation of an author’s “intrinsic
dimension of creativity” that is “characterized by spiritual or
inspirational motivations . . . inherent in the creative task itself”
and which can be the result of the author’s “desire for challenge,
personal satisfaction, or the creation of works with a particular
meaning or significance.”59
Milton wrote Paradise Lost within the context of his
experiences in his own society during the fall of the Reformation,
was influenced by other authors and writers of his time,60 and
published and distributed his work to the reading public in a
manner that was uniquely his own.61 Contextualizing authorship
as the creation and production of a work that manifests an author’s
unique nature and personality requires a willingness to accept
authors within the copyright system as autonomous individuals
possessing natural rights in their work that are separate from
and lofty measures to sing and celebrate.’ What that Song of Triumph would have been
like, we cannot know, but surmise holds that it would have been a Spenserian romance on
the Matter of Britain, raised to the ecstasy of a redeemed nation. Instead, Cromwell dies,
the Revolution of the Saints failed, and blind Milton composed Paradise Lost.”).
57
John Milton, Areopagitica (1664), A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing
to the Parliament of England, in MILTON, supra note 48, at 339.
58
Milton considered books to contain the soul of the author. He states:
books are not absolutely dead things . . . . [They] contain a potency
of life in them to be as active as the soul was whose progeny they are
. . . . [T]hey do preserve as in a vial the purest efficacy and extraction
of that living intellect that bred them . . . [and] he who destroys a
good book, kills reason itself, kills the image of God . . . .
Id. at 342.
59
Kwall, supra note 24, at 1945.
60
The character of Satan and Lucifer in Milton’s Paradise Lost, for example, was
influenced by Christopher Marlowe and William Shakespeare. BLOOM, THE WESTERN
CANON, supra note 8, at 158–70.
61
Paradise Lost was an immediate success when it was published in 1667. MILTON,
supra note 48, at xxvi. It was mentioned in Parliament, given the highest praise by John
Dryden, the English poet, dramatist and critic and sold well. Id. Milton’s readers who
were “implacably hostile to Milton on political grounds,” had also acknowledged “the
poem’s greatness.” Id.
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economic rights to print, publish and distribute works. In this
sense of authorship, authors independent of publishers and printers
of their work are able to enter into and agree to be bound to a
social contract that provides for the fair allocation of entitlements
in literary and artistic works within a civil society.
A. The Romantic Author
In literary studies and copyright jurisprudence, the romantic
author is an author, who by a sudden stroke of genius, creates a
new and original piece of work independently.62 He or she
represents the creative genius in romanticism who has the
brilliance, ability and talent to produce new works out of thin air63
and embodies the romantic ideals of “originality, organic form, and
the [conception] of the work of art as the expression of the unique
personality of the artist”64 in human form. In literary studies and
copyright jurisprudence, this idea of the romantic author is not well
accepted by many scholars in both fields for two primary reasons.
The first reason given by scholars is that most authors build upon
the works of other authors and are not always entirely original in
the works that they create.65 To adopt a romantic model of
62

Depoorter, supra note 42, at 25.
Id.
64
Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective
Creativity, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 293, 295 (1992).
65
See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 1010–11 (1990)
[hereinafter Litman, The Public Domain] (“An author, be she writer, composer, or
sculptor, seeks to communicate her own expression of the world. Her views of the world
are shaped by her experiences, by the other works of authorship she has absorbed (which
are also her experiences), and by the interaction between the two. Her brain has not
organized all of this into neat, separable piles entitled ‘things that happened to me,’
‘things I read once,’ and ‘things I thought up in a vacuum’ to enable her to draw the
elements of her works of authorship from the correct pile. She did not, after all,
experience them so discretely. A snatch of a tune she heard was infected by the shape of
the place where she was sitting when she heard it; her sense of a pattern she saw was
colored by that day’s weather; a conversation she overheard was tainted by the book that
she was reading at the time. Her memories of the song, the pattern, the conversation,
filtered through her experience, may in fact seem quite unlike the objects she believes
they represent. The counterpoint between a sound from one memory and a smell from
another may express something quite different from what either seems to say alone. But
when the author mines the raw material for her next work, significant portions of it will
be the stuff of the outside world mediated by her experience. It is unsurprising, then, that
parts of her work will echo the works of others.”).
63

VOL19_BOOK2_NG

2/26/2009 3:27:18 AM

2009] ALLOCATING ENTITLEMENTS IN THE COPYRIGHT SYSTEM

431

authorship for the copyright system when authors are, in reality,
heavily influenced by their external conditions and experiences
would be a “disservice” to authors.66 In producing new works,
authors also collaborate with co-authors and with the general
public in collaborative projects facilitated by the Internet and
online technologies such as Wikipedia,67 and are therefore not the
solitary individual geniuses creating works in recluse and isolation
that the romantic notion of authorship seems to uphold.68 The
second reason given by scholars against the romantic author is that
relying on the idea of romantic authorship and originality to
provide and expand property rights in literary and artistic works,69
when applied to the regulation of information in situations far from
the ambit of intellectual property,70 entrenches the romantic author
and the idea of individual originality into the copyright system,71
devalues information sources such as genetic information,72

66

See id. at 1011 (“All works of authorship, even the most creative, include some
elements adapted from raw material that the author first encountered in someone else’s
works.”).
67
Wikipedia is a collaborative free online encyclopedia. See Wikipedia, http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page.
68
Lior Zemer, The Copyright Moment, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 247, 310 (2006).
69
James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail and
Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413, 1468 (1992) (“The rise of this powerful (and
historically contingent) stereotype [of the genius whose style forever expresses a single
unique persona] provided the necessary raw material to fashion some convincing
mediation of the tension between the imagery of public and private in information
production.”). The idea of the romantic author provided the conceptual, moral and
philosophical justification for giving authors property rights. Id.
70
Professor Boyle argues that the idea of originality, stemming from the notion of
romantic authorship, can be seen to have influenced legal scholarship on blackmail,
insider trading and case law on the protection of genetic information. Id. at 1470–520.
71
The romantic author is a “socially constructed and historically contingent” idea that
is necessary to resolve the tensions of granting property rights over information in the
public sphere. Id. at 1525. The “figure of the romantic author, the associated theme of
originality and the conceptual distinction between idea and expression” reduces these
tensions. Id. at 1525–26.
72
Professor Boyle provides the example of the rosy-periwinkle plant of Madagascar
used by indigenous tribes to cure diabetes. See id. at 1530–31. It was used by a
pharmaceutical company to manufacture a drug for chemotherapy treatment and “yielded
a drug to cure Hodgkin’s disease and a trade in the drug worth $100m a year.” Id.
However, Madagascar, “without an income from its huge biological wealth . . . has
chopped down most of its forests to feed its people.” Id. As the country could “find no
place in a legal regime constructed around a vision of individual, transformative, original
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marginalizes the protection of information that does not fit the
romantic model of authorship from misappropriation73 and ignores
non-individualistic cultural production.74 The romantic notion of
authorship is therefore seen as a justification for “exclusive
monopoly-type rights” that disables the ability to recognize nonauthorial-type sources of information and discounts other forms of
authorship and downstream uses of works, and ought to be
properly accounted for in the copyright system if it is to be
“criticized and reformulated.”75
The accuracy of this contextualization of the romantic author
and this basis for objecting to the notion of the individual author as
an independent creator in the copyright system may however be
questioned, for an insistence on authorship that is independent and
uninfluenced by the works of others in order for an author to be
properly recognized as an individual creator is misleading. The
influence of other authors and works of authorship, as well as
existing works or external experiences and perceptions, upon an
author does not make the author less autonomous, original or
creative. The best and most talented authors are influenced in one
way or the other by other authors, and it is difficult, if not
impossible, for authors to write and create without any form of
influence, or inspiration by, the works of others.76 William

genius, the indigenous peoples are driven to deforestation, or slash-and-burn farming.”
Id.
73
Professor Jaszi cites the case of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Services
Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), as an example of this form of marginalization where the
Supreme Court decided that facts are not in themselves protected by copyright. Jaszi,
supra note 64, at 301–02. The only way copyright protection will be provided is if those
facts are arranged in a way that is original and “founded in the creative powers of the
mind.” Id.
74
Professor Jaszi explains that “[c]opyright law, with its emphasis on rewarding and
safeguarding ‘originality,’ has lost sight of the cultural value of what might be called
‘serial collaborations’—works resulting from successive elaborations of an idea or text
by a series of creative workers, occurring perhaps over years or decades.” Id. at 304.
75
Keith Aoki, Adrift in the Intertext: Authorship and Audience “Recoding” Rights—
Comment on Robert H. Rotstein, “Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and the
Fiction of the Work,” 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 805, 823 (1993).
76
Professor Bloom speaks about the “anxiety of influence” on an author as the author
reads a literary work and explains the influence authors have on each other by stating:
[w]ithout Keats’s reading of Shakespeare, Milton and Woodsworth,
we could not have Keats’s odes and sonnets and his two Hyperions.
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Shakespeare, for example, was influenced by Christopher
Marlowe,77 and John Milton, by both Shakespeare and Marlowe.78
Yet their works have had a pronounced effect on society, and both
Shakespeare and Milton are referred to as the embodiment of
geniuses.79 An author’s genius may be measured not only by the
romantic notion of originality and creativity but also by the value
society places on his or her work by the benefit and enrichment it
confers on its readers (for literature), listeners (for music) or
viewers (for art).80 This idea that “genius,”81 present in the
romantic author, may be measured by both originality and
creativity as well as social enrichment puts the notion of the
romantic author in a different copyright context that recognizes
various stages of creativity, originality and social value that are, in
reality, attached to a work of authorship. The recognition of
varying stages of creativity and originality, as well as social value
for a work, removes the author as a mere social construct, devised
to justify the grant of property rights over public information, and
puts the notion of original authorship at the center of the copyright
system to provide the basis for granting entitlements in literary and
artistic works according to the varying stages of creativity and
originality, as well as the social value of a work, on natural law
principles of fairness and justice.
Without Tennyson’s reading of Keats, we would have almost no
Tennyson. Wallace Stevens, hostile to all suggestions that he owed
anything to his reading of precursor poets, would have left us nothing
of value but for Walt Whitman, whom Stevens sometimes scorned,
almost never overtly imitated, yet uncannily resurrected . . . .
Bloom, supra note 2, at xxiii.
77
Id. at xxi.
78
Milton’s Lucifer and Satan in Paradise Lost were influenced by the work of
Christopher Marlowe and William Shakespeare respectively. See BLOOM, THE WESTERN
CANON, supra note 8, at 166.
79
BLOOM, GENIUS, supra note 6, at 15–30 (discussing Shakespeare), 45–57 (discussing
Milton).
80
Professor Bloom explains that to “confront the extraordinary in a book—be it the
Bible, Plato, Shakespeare, Dante, Proust—is to benefit almost without cost. Genius, in
its writing, is our best path for reaching wisdom . . . the true use of literature for life.” Id.
at 4–5. He goes on to state a person’s “deepest desire is for survival, whether in the here
and now, or transcendentally elsewhere,” and that “[t]o be augmented by the genius of
others is to enhance the possibilities of survival, at least in the present and the near
future.” Id.
81
Id.
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The second critique against the romantic author, that the notion
of the individual genius is used to justify the expansion of property
rights,82 is also a weak critique against the notion of the individual
creator as the locus of authorship and creativity in the copyright
system, for the expansion of property rights is an affirmation of
market influence on the creation and production of literary and
artistic works as opposed to the individual author or creator. The
law of intellectual property cannot be explained by the notion of
the romantic author, and the idea of the individual creator is
indeed, in many ways, “affirmatively inimical” to the law of
intellectual property.83 As Professor Ben Depoorter rightly points
out, there is no link showing “an increased romantic conception
over time to the expanding reaction of intellectual property law.”84
The expansion of property rights in intellectual property is a result
of “changes in economic values that stem from the development of
new technology and the opening up of new markets.”85 Identifying
romantic authorship as the basis for granting entitlements in
literary and artistic works to authors, whose incentives to create are
82

See supra text accompanying note 69.
Mark Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REV.
873, 882–85 (1997) (reviewing JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996)). Professor Lemley goes
on to explain that the idea of romantic authorship may be invoked to demand strong
copyright for first-generation authors and for a wider interpretation of fair use for “a
second-generation author who has ‘transformed’ a first-generation work” and that “[i]n
practice, the rhetoric of romantic authorship seems to be largely unrelated to the legal
rules that govern these cases.” Id. at 885.
84
See Depoorter, supra note 42, at 26. Depoorter argues that the expansion of the
intellectual property system is not a result of a “romantic conception of authorship”:
For the argument to be upheld, an historical explanation needs to link
an increased romantic conception over time to the expanding reaction
of intellectual property law. It is questionable whether such a
continued rise in the romantic conception of authorship over time has
occurred.
To the contrary, the economic reality of today’s
intellectual property laws, perhaps best exemplified by the rise of
corporate copyright ownership and the transfer of employee
inventions to employers, conflicts with ‘author- or inventor-centrism’
and romantic notions of authorship. In another view, the conception
of authorship is in itself troublesome. If we concede to the
deconstructionist viewpoint, authorship is suspect since texts are
unstable and originality is inherently problematic.
Id.
85
Id. at 28.
83
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intrinsic and not dependent on the commercial market for literary
and artistic works, is therefore unlikely to give rise to increased
property rights in the present conception of the copyright system
where individual rights serve collective welfare maximization and
social good. The conception of copyright on utilitarian principles
perceives property rights as a statutory grant to further the public
interest, deemphasizes the natural rights that an author ought to
have by virtue of his or her originality and creativity86 and finds
the notion of the romantic author to have very little relevance in
granting entitlements and calibrating rights among parties in the
copyright system.
However, a conception of the copyright system based on
deontological ethics seeking to encourage authorship that is
independent of patronage, government subsidy and the market
necessitates the central presence of the romantic author in the
copyright system. While the notion of the romantic author gives
authors, as original creators of a work, entitlements in literary and
artistic works on the basis of fairness and justice and may
introduce moral and ethical restraints and limitations on the
exercise of these rights as a social agreement authors enter into in a
well-ordered civil society, the notion also serves to encourage the
production of works of authentic authorship that manifests an
author’s expression of individual personality in a way that
facilitates a diversity in literary and artistic works that are publicly
available. Utilitarian philosophy underlying the present copyright
system grants rights to authors to allow society to pursue larger
goals, such as “the Progress of Science and useful Arts,”87 and
86

Craig W. Dallon, The Problem with Congress and Copyright Law: Forgetting the
Past and Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365, 367–68 (2004)
(“The utilitarian, or public benefit, rationale of copyright law (the ‘public benefit
rationale’) suggests that copyright protection exists to encourage the creation of works
and public access to those works. . . . [C]opyright law provides an incentive, in the form
of a limited monopoly, for authors to create works . . . [that] is balanced against the
public’s need for access to the work. . . . [C]opyright is a grant or privilege created by
statute, which can then be altered and limited by statute.”); see also PATTERSON,
COPYRIGHT, supra note 7, at 198. Patterson contends that the “tone” of the Copyright Act
of 1790 is “completely different from that of the states’ acts and the constitutional
provision. The ideas of protecting the author and promoting learning have become
subordinated to the ideas that copyright is a government grant and a monopoly.” Id.
87
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

VOL19_BOOK2_NG

436

2/26/2009 3:27:18 AM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 19:413

design these rights to achieve the maximum level of authorial
productivity that will allow for the greatest distribution of a work
within society.88 The utilitarian system requires only a minimal
amount of authorial creativity in the production of the work89 and
undermines highly original and creative contributions that the
romantic author may make to society by creatively producing
socially valuable and enriching pieces of literature or artistic
works.
The recognition of natural rights in literary and artistic works
based on an author’s originality and creativity and the social value
of a work liberates authors to freely create without setting limits to
their creativity and originality defined by that which appeals to the
widest segment of society, and encourages the creation of works
that are highly original and creative and that bring value to and
enrich society. Romantic authorship places authors in the center of
the copyright system as the owners of initial entitlements in literary
and artistic works, not merely as a social construct that is
historically contingent on the development of the commercial
market for literary and artistic works,90 but as individuals within a
88

Netanel, Copyright, supra note 20, at 309. Professor Netanel defines this
philosophy of copyright as a “neoclassicist approach,” where “copyright is primarily a
mechanism for market facilitation, for moving existing creative works to their highest
socially valued uses.” Id. He goes on:
Copyright can best serve this goal, neoclassicism suggests, by
enabling copyright owners to realize the full profit potential for their
works in the market. In maximizing their profit, neoclassicists argue,
copyright owners will both rationalize the ‘development’ of existing
creative works and sell exploitation entitlements to those who are
best able to satisfy public tastes.
Id.
89
See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250–51 (1902).
According to Justice Holmes:
[A] very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is
one man’s alone. That something he may copyright unless there is a
restriction in the words of the [Copyright] [A]ct. . . . It would be a
dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.
Id.
90
See Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural
Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1329 (“Literary accounts of romantic
authorship . . . in the mid-to-late eighteenth century, together with the emergent private
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legal system seeking “To promote the Progress of Science and the
useful Arts”91 by encouraging authorship that is highly original and
creative and that brings value and enrichment to society. The
notion of the highly original and creative romantic author, who
produces works that transcend time and cultures, provides authors
with a sound basis for acquiring legal entitlements to works that
copyright jurisprudence has yet to accept as being based on an
author’s natural rights in works of authorship. The next part of the
discussion on authorship evaluates the emergence of the author in
the copyright system and asserts that the construction of the author
to serve the growing commercial market for literary and artistic
works, rather than the acceptance of the author as an individual
making original and creative contributions to society through the
creation, publication and dissemination of a work, mistakenly
relies on the market as the institution to encourage creative and
artistic production. The market, while facilitating consensual
exchanges of property rights in literary and artistic works to reward
authors to some extent, discourages the creation of highly original
and creative works of authorship that are enriching and of value to
society.
B. Authorship in Copyright Jurisprudence
Contemporary copyright scholarship on authorship presents the
author as a socially constructed figure that lacks precise or definite
meaning.92 Martha Woodmansee calls the author a “recent
invention”93 that was conceived to elevate the status of writers as
sphere of the marketplace and civil society, provided a framework to begin speaking of
the ‘private property’ of authors, which was underwritten by their ‘originality’ and
protected via copyright law. The possibility that an ‘original’ idea of an author might be
possessable as ‘property’ entered copyright through the discourse of romantic
authorship.”); Boyle, supra note 69, at 1462 (“Encouraged by an enormous reading
public, by several apocryphal tales of writers who were household names yet still lived in
poverty, and by a new, more romantic vision of authorship, writers began to demand
greater economic returns from their labors. One obvious strategy was to lobby for some
kind of legal right in the text—the right that we would call copyright.”).
91
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
92
See Zemer, supra note 68, at 251. Zemer notes that contemporary scholarship on
authorship convincingly argues that the “author is deconstructed into a vessel through
which many influences and experiences are poured.” Id.
93
WOODMANSEE, supra note 37, at 36.
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craftsmen by labeling them geniuses who do something that is
“utterly new, unprecedented, or . . . produces something that never
existed before.”94 By bearing the mark of a genius author, instead
of a working craftsman, German writers during the Renaissance
period in the eighteenth century could establish ownership over the
products of their labor and justify the recognition of legal rights in
works in the form of copyright law.95 The English poet Edward
Young, in his Conjectures of Original Composition, perceived of
the revered author as one whose work “stand[s] distinguished,” and
in which he has the “sole property” that alone can “confer the
noble title of an author[,] that is, of one who . . . thinks and
composes[,] while other invaders of the press, how voluminous
and learned soever . . . only read and write.”96 The idea of the
author as a creative genius therefore was a way by which writers of
literary works could obtain status and wealth without the aid of
their patrons by selling their works to the reading public through
the commercial market for books.97 Mark Rose affirms this
conception of the author as a social construct and refers to the
author as a “cultural formation” that is “inseparable from the
commodification of literature.”98
Professor Rose proposes
proprietorship as the identifying mark on the modern author that
represents the person who is the “originator and therefore the
owner of a special kind of commodity, the work.”99 This special
relationship between author and the work establishes a link
between originality and ownership that provides the foundation for
the copyright system, which had developed as a response to the
printing press, the individual and romantic author, and the
commercial marketplace,100 and to allocate legal entitlements in

94

Id. at 39.
Id. at 36, 39.
96
Id. at 39.
97
See id. at 37.
98
ROSE, supra note 10, at 1.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 3 (“[C]opyright [is] the practice of securing marketable rights in texts that are
treated as commodities [and is a] specifically modern institution, the creature of the
printing press, the individualization of authorship in the later Middle Ages and early
Renaissance, and the development of the advanced marketplace in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries.”).
95
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literary and artistic works by “drawing lines between works” and
“where one text ends and another begins.”101
It is unclear if this conception of the romantic author as an
individual creative genius truly obscures copyright jurisprudence
on the process of authorship and blinds the law to the reality of
creative and cultural production in the copyright system, as literary
thinkers suggest. Northorp Frye pointed out that literary works are
seldom independently created works that bear no relation to
already existing works.102 Literature is never isolated as an
individual piece of work that is not an imitation of other works,
and to Professor Frye, it would be a pretension for the copyright
system to treat all art works as “an invention distinctive enough to
be patented,”103 for
[t]his state of things makes it difficult to appraise a
literature which includes Chaucer, much of whose
poetry is translated or paraphrased from others;
Shakespeare, whose plays sometimes follow their
sources almost verbatim; and Milton, who asked for
nothing better than to steal as much as possible out
of the Bible.104
It is indeed difficult, if not impossible, to imagine the lone
poet, sitting with a pencil and a few blank pieces of paper,
producing a poem “ex nihilo,” or “from nothing,”105 as an image
representing how creative works of authorship are produced. The
critique literary thinkers have against this image of the romantic
author is its failure to reflect the reality that creative production is a
process of using existing works, reinterpreting the work and
incorporating its idea into a new work or form of expression. The
primary concern with the use of this notion of romantic authorship
as a basis for the grant of rights in creative works through the
copyright system is that the law will make it difficult for authors to

101
102
103
104
105

Id.
See NORTHROP FRYE, AN ANATOMY OF CRITICISM 97 (Princeton Univ. Press 1957).
Id. at 96.
Id.
Id. at 97.
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use the works of other authors in their creation of new works by
creating legal barriers to accessing existing works of authorship.106
However, access barriers to other forms of copyrighted works
arise from property rights, granted as an incentive to create, that
allow authors to commercialize their work on the market for
economic rewards, and which are not in any way related to the
notion of the romantic author. Access barriers exist as a legal
protection to prevent non-paying members of society from using a
work by creating an artificial scarcity needed to make a work
marketable as a commodity and to provide authors with economic
rewards for their work within a utilitarian-based copyright
system.107 Property rights are therefore a utilitarian legal measure
used to encourage the production of literary and artistic works for
the greater good of society108 by maximizing social welfare and
redistributing wealth through market institutions in the system.109

106

Id. at 98 (“The copyright law, and the mores attached to it, make it difficult for a
modern novelist to steal anything except his title from the rest of literature . . . .”).
107
Peter Eckersley, Virtual Markets for Virtual Goods: The Mirror Image of Digital
Copyright, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 126 (2004) (“‘[D]eadweight loss[]’ . . . [is] the
principal cost of enforcing scarcity in a good which is otherwise available in
abundance.”); Ryan, supra note 31, at 545–47 (“Because an author can prevent free riders
from copying and distributing an author’s work without paying copyright royalties,
copyright protection creates an artificial scarcity in the means of accessing a creative
work and gives the copyright owner a monopoly in the resulting market for such
access.”).
108
See Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 100 (1997) (“Copyright monopoly induces production of
information by allowing non-payers to be excluded and information to be marketed at a
monopoly price. At the same time, however, copyright law limits this monopoly to serve
the ultimate purpose of maximizing access to information. The law thus regulates access
to information by balancing incentives to create and accessibility of information.”);
Kreiss, supra note 29, at 7–8 (“In copyright theory, the more works that are disseminated,
the more this goal [of promoting the Progress of Science] is advanced. . . . [T]he rights
given to copyright authors are a means to an end rather than an end in itself. . . . ‘[T]he
ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good.’” (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975))
(footnotes omitted)).
109
Shubha Ghosh, The Fable of the Commons: Exclusivity and the Construction of
Intellectual Property Markets, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855, 869 (2007) (“Property rights,
as defined and enforced by legal institutions, may facilitate the definition of wealth or
welfare. . . . [T]he structure of markets will also determine how wealth or welfare is both
defined and allocated. For example, in a perfectly competitive market, buyers and sellers

VOL19_BOOK2_NG

2/26/2009 3:27:18 AM

2009] ALLOCATING ENTITLEMENTS IN THE COPYRIGHT SYSTEM

441

Professor Frye’s concern that new authors will not have access to
expressions in existing works, which are a natural part of the
literary and artistic culture and are used to inspire the creation of
new works and in expressing new thoughts, is a consequence of
expanding property rights in creative works from a perceived
tragedy of the commons,110 which posits that commonly held open
resources, such as information, will be depleted through overuse
and underinvestment by the public.111 The resulting expansion of
property rights in information is a counter-tragedy on the opposite
side of the coin, known commonly to property and intellectual
property scholars as the “tragedy of the anticommons,”112 that,
when applied to intellectual property law, reveals the susceptibility
of information, which includes literary and artistic works, toward
over-propertization, under-use and inaccessibility.113
respond solely to price signals, and price adjusts to allocate resources based on buyers’
willingness to pay and sellers’ willingness to accept.”).
110
The “Tragedy of the Commons” was explored in an article written by Garrett
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). Here, the use of the
word “commons” is an “open access” to a common resource that is not to be confused
with a “common pool resource” that is not prone to depletion due to common resource
management. Carol Rose, Left Brain, Right Brain, and History in the New Law and
Economics of Property, 79 OR. L. REV. 479, 480–81 (2000).
111
Mark Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 129, 141–43 (2004) (discussing the nature and origin of the tragedy of the
commons as an argument to prevent the overuse of information and seek stronger and
perpetual property rights in information).
112
Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 624 (1988). The tragedy of the anticommons
occurs when resources are underused as opposed to overuse in the tragedy of the
commons. When multiple owners are given the right to exclude others from a scarce
resource without giving anyone the effective privilege of use, the tragedy of the
anticommons will result. Professor Heller uses empty Moscow store fronts in a statecontrolled (as opposed to a market facilitated) property system as a paradigm of the
anticommons. Id. at 622–25. For discussion of the tragedy of the commons in relation to
the concept of the anticommons in property law, see Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest
Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907, 933–40 (2004), and also see ROSE, supra note 10.
The tragedy of the anticommons has also been applied to the fragmentation that property
rights will cause over the use of information on the Internet, which will result in greater
transaction costs to clear rights and prevent the development of new information or
knowledge. See Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place, and the Tragedy of the Anticommons,
91 CAL. L. REV. 439, 511–12 (2003).
113
Mark Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX.
L. REV. 989, 997–98 (1997). Intellectual property rights limit access to and use of old
works for improvement. Professor Lemley explains that:
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The propensity of property rights to create access barriers to
information is the primary reason why markets may not efficiently
allocate entitlements in literary and artistic works, resulting in the
inaccessibility to works that conventional literary thinking
mistakenly attributes to the notion of the romantic author and the
requirement for “originality” and “creativity” in the production of
a work.114 Markets are imperfect and sometimes fail for various
reasons. Sometimes, it may be too expensive for new authors to
negotiate for use of a work (transaction costs for obtaining
permission may be too high), it may be too difficult for authors to
enforce the law against those who infringe their rights, or market
deficiencies may preclude consensual exchanges between authors
in the copyright system.115 Relying on the market to efficiently
allocate entitlements to creative works and provide economic
[t]he creators of old works can, if they choose, refuse to distribute
them to anyone at all, at any price, during the duration of intellectual
property protection. . . . [T]hey can and do exercise control over who
can use their creation, the purposes for which they can use it, and the
price they must pay . . . [and] use these rights not only to obtain a
return on their investment in research and development, but also to
exercise content control over subsequent uses of their works or to
prevent the development of a competitive market for their products.
Id.; see also Hunter, supra note 112, at 511 (stating that gene patents contribute to the
anticommons by blocking innovative uses of gene fragments and prevent the recognition
that better uses are possible).
114
Anna Nimus, Copyright, Copyleft and the Creative Anti-Commons (2006),
http://subsol.c3.hu/subsol_2/contributors0/nimustext.html.
115
Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 32, at 1613. Professor Gordon argues that the
judiciary should consider use of a work to be fair use when a defendant to an
infringement claim could not purchase the right to use the work through the market,
allowing the use of the work would serve the public interest and there would be no
substantial impairment to the copyright owner’s incentives. Id. at 1601. On the point of
market failures, Professor Gordon states:
Copyright markets will not, however, always function adequately.
Though the copyright law has provided a means for excluding
nonpurchasers and thus has attempted to cure the public goods
problem, and though it has provided mechanisms to facilitate
consensual transfers, at times bargaining may be exceedingly
expensive or it may be impractical to obtain enforcement against
nonpurchasers, or other market flaws might preclude achievement of
desirable consensual exchanges. In those cases, the market cannot be
relied on to mediate public interests in dissemination and private
interests in remuneration.
Id. at 1613.
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rewards to authors fails to produce the kind of works that authentic
authorship guarantees with the recognition of the romantic author
as a creative individual, producing literature and art within a wellordered copyright society.116 The realization that the market
cannot support authentic expressions of authorship occurred to
German poet, philosopher, historian and dramatist Friedrich von
Schiller, the hard way.117 When breaking away from the patronage
of the Duke of Württemberg to be a professional author, Schiller
had referred to the public as being “everything” to him and exalted
in the grandiosity of authorship that came from “appealing to no
other throne than the human spirit.”118
However, the market turned out to be a difficult patron in
giving rewards for original creative expressions of the human
spirit, as Schiller, who became deep in financial debt, later found
out as he stated that “the German public forces its writers to choose
according to commercial calculations rather than the dictates of
genius. I shall devote all my energies to this Thalia, but I won’t
deny that I would have employed them in another sphere if my
condition placed me beyond business considerations.”119
Eventually, in accepting a pension from Prince Friedrich Christian
von Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Augustenburg a decade later,
Schiller stated that it is “impossible in the German world of letters
to satisfy the strict demands of art and simultaneously procure the
minimum support for one’s industry.”120 Putting the market and
the common good before the recognizing of the inherent rights of
authors in their creations in classical utilitarian thinking121 affirms
116

WOODMANSEE, supra note 37, at 41–42.
Id. at 40–41.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 80. For a detailed treatment of Schiller’s experience with the reading public
and the commercial market, see id. at 59–86.
120
Id. at 41.
121
Professor Rawls explains this idea in Lectures of the History of Moral Philosophy:
[C]lassical utilitarianism starts with a conception of the good—as
pleasure, or as happiness, or as the satisfaction of desire, preferences,
or interests; and it may also impose the condition that these desires,
preferences, or interests be rational . . . in a teleological doctrine, a
conception of the good is given prior to and independently of the
right (or the moral law); thus, for example, utilitarianism defines the
right as maximizing the good (say, as happiness or the satisfaction of
117
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the market as the patron for authorship, undermines the process of
authorial creativity and defeats the purpose of the copyright system
to encourage the creation of literary and artistic works for the
benefit of society by compelling authors to produce creative works
that appeal to the preferences of the commercial market.122 By
conceiving the author as a social construction responding to the
emerging commercial market for books, literary scholarship
discards an important concept in copyright jurisprudence that may
be used to fairly allocate entitlements in literary and artistic works
and that is independent of market dynamics. For example, the use
of Ernest Hemingway’s conversational anecdotes, reminiscences,
literary opinions and comments on some of his fictional characters
in an independently published work of authorship by a less wellknown author and friend, A. E. Hotchner, ought to be recognized
as a separate work of authorship that did not affect the market for
other literary creations by Hemingway when the raw materials
used in creating the work were obtained with the consent and
approval of Hemingway.123
Authentic authorship occurs when a fair and just distribution of
entitlements can be made among all parties in the copyright
system. Utilitarian-based copyright systems that emphasize the
institution of the market to facilitate resource allocation offer an
unstable foundation for providing fairness and justice in the
distribution of legal entitlements among authors, readers and
publishers/distributors. There are many contributing factors that

rational preferences), and moral worth of character as having, say, a
character that can be relied on to lead us to do what is right.
JOHN RAWLS, LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 222 (Barbara Herman
ed., Harvard Univ. Press 2000).
122
Netanel, Copyright, supra note 20, at 309. Professor Netanel explains that with
neoclassicist (the approach to copyright that favors expansion of property rights in
literary and artistic works) economics, copyright is a mechanism for copyright owners to
put “existing creative works to their highest socially valued uses” and “realize the full
profit potential for their works in the market.” Id. Copyright’s purpose is to determine
the worth of creative works and provide a guide for resource allocation rather than ensure
that authors have the incentives to create. Id.
123
Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, 244 N.E.2d 250, 256 (N.Y. 1968). In this
case, the New York Court of Appeals decided that Hotchner could draw freely from his
conversations with Hemingway to write and publish articles about him where these
materials were obtained through consent. Id. at 255–56.
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encourage creativity and the production of literary works. The
unique creative process of authorship that occurs with each
individual author produces so diverse an assemblage of literary and
artistic works within society that it would be unfair and unjust to
assume that all forms of creative works may be valued by the
commercial market’s sole valuation of creative works. Our
musical experience of Mozart is very different from our musical
experience of Bob Dylan, and it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to value these different composers and their musical
compositions by way of a single metric unit124—that of social
progress in “Science and useful Arts”125—in the case for copyright.
The fact that creative works may have economic value on the
market does not lessen the importance of the author figure and the
notion of romantic authorship as notions that give rise to the
recognition of natural rights that are separate and incommensurable
with economic rights over works.
Collective works and
copyrighted works of corporate ownership are valued differently
124
Cass Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779,
799–800 (1994). Professor Sunstein explores the claims that human values are plural and
diverse (i.e., not reducible to some larger and more encompassing value) and human
goods are not commensurable (i.e., assessable along a single metric), and emphasizes the
need for legal scholars to regard the notion of incommensurability of human goods as
requiring sustained interest for legal systems to function well. Id. at 780, 861. On the
point of music valuation, Professor Sunstein asks that we:
Consider the suggestion that a single metric is available with which
to align our different kinds of valuation. For example, Mozart may
be valued in a different way from Bob Dylan, but there may be a
metric by which to value different composers; and, along that metric,
Mozart may be superior to Dylan. (I believe that any such metric
would be false to our experience of music, and hence I do not think
that this sort of approach will work; but I am trying here to show how
the two claims might be separated.) In any case some people think
that there are diverse values—pleasure from a warm sun, gratitude
from unexpected kindness, and so forth—while also believing that
these can all be reduced to a general concept like utility, happiness, or
pleasure. Utilitarians need not deny the diversity of human goods, or
that pleasures and pains come in different forms. The claim of
incommensurability is that no unitary metric accounts for how we
actually think and that the effort to introduce one misdescribes
experience . . . [and] that the misdescription can yield both inaccurate
predictions and bad recommendations for ethics and politics.
Id. at 799–800.
125
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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from the works of individual authors in terms of economic, social
or communal, rather than personal, value,126 but it would be a
shortcoming of copyright jurisprudence to relegate the romantic
author and its notion of authorship to mere social constructs
responding to an emerging commercial market for creative works.
By denying authors and the process of creative authorship their due
recognition as separate and distinct non-economic notions, we may
have ignored and missed an important part of copyright
jurisprudence that provides the basis for just and fair allocation of
legal entitlements in a civil copyright society.
C. Authors, Readers and Publishers/Distributors
The importance of the central roles of authors and creative
authorship in the copyright system may have been neglected as a
result of early copyright law development within the bookpublishing business.127 The privileges granted to printers to print
books represented the earliest form of copyright, which begun as a
publisher’s right to print copies of a work and prevent any
unauthorized printing of the same work.128 The right was
essentially an economic right which protected the receipts of
profits from publication of a work and prevented the piracy of
books that would undercut profits.129 Generally, the title of a work
126

Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, “Author-Stories:” Narrative’s Implications for Moral
Rights and Copyright’s Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2001). The
doctrine on joint authorship doctrine focuses largely on economic rather than personal
rights but yet, as Professor Kwall argues:
[J]oint authorship implicates the personal rights of creators on a most
fundamental level because the doctrine concerns itself with who
qualifies for authorship status. Authorship recognition is especially
critical for the majority of nondominant authors who contribute to
collaborative works because without recognition they are denied any
sort of right of attribution by virtue of inadequate federal protection
for their moral rights. In practice, the operation of the joint
authorship doctrine privileges the voices of dominant authors over
those of nondominant contributors, thereby submerging the voices of
those who furnish qualitatively important, although quantitatively
less significant, components of a particular work.
Id.
127
PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT, supra note 7, at 43–44.
128
Id.
129
See id. at 44.
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and the name of the person who was entitled to publish the book
would be entered into a register book with the Stationer’s
Company,130 the guild for bookbinders, printers and publishers.131
In this early copyright system, there was no explicit mention of the
rights of an author over the work by virtue of the author’s creative
authorship of the work, and authors, specifically excluded from
membership of the Stationer’s Company, had very little influence
on the development of this early form of copyright as a right to
print and publish books and manuscripts.132
However, an author’s rights over uses of the manuscript itself
appear to be implicitly recognized in the relationship and
contractual dealings for the sale of the manuscript between authors
and publishers.133 Lyman Ray Patterson argues that these contracts
between authors and publishers, which require a promise from
authors not to interfere with the publication of a work,134 or which
allowed a retention by the author of his right to make additions,
corrections and amendments to the work after it was sold,135
indicate that the publishers had only a very narrow right to publish
a work and that authors possessed a residual right in works that
was not automatically transferred to the publisher by sale of the
manuscript.136 Authors therefore had a creative right in the work
that publishers recognized as an author’s continued interest in the
work by virtue of the author’s creativity, which the publisher had
very little control over.137
This separation of authors’ rights from the narrow right of
publishers to publish manuscripts is an important separation
between natural and economic rights that ought to be

130

Id. at 51.
For a detailed discussion on the Stationer’s Company, see id. at 28–41.
132
Id. at 64–65.
133
Id. at 65–67.
134
Id. at 73. John Milton’s contract for Paradise Lost included a promise that Milton,
as the author, would not interfere with the publication of the work. Id. at 74.
135
Id. at 74–75. In a contract between the poet James Thomson and the publisher
Millar, Thomson assigned the “right and property of printing” and “all benefit of all
additions, corrections, and amendments which should be afterwards made in the same
copies.” Id.
136
Id. at 75.
137
Id. at 75–76.
131
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acknowledged as creating two distinct sets of rights—property
entitlements and economic privileges—in copyright jurisprudence.
The Statute of Anne blurred this distinction by codifying the
stationer’s copyright138 while emphasizing the authors as being
vested with the copyright in their works to limit the monopoly that
publishers had over the book trade.139 This strategy employed by
Parliament to break up the monopoly of publishers caused any
natural rights that authors had in their work by virtue of their
creative authorship to merge with the economic privilege that
publishers possessed to profit from the publication and
dissemination of a work.140 This merger of natural entitlements
138

Id. at 146. Professor Patterson contends:
The most significant point about the statutory copyright is that it was
almost certainly a codification of the stationer’s copyright. The
similarity of the two is too great to be coincidental . . . . [T]he
stationer’s copyright was probably the only copyright familiar to
Parliament . . . . The method of acquiring the statutory copyright was
similar to that for acquiring the stationer’s copyright—registration of
the title of a work prior to publication in the register books of the
Stationer’s Company . . . the protection given by the statute was the
same protection given by the stationer’s copyright—protection from
the piracy of printed works.

Id.
139

Id. at 145. As Professor Patterson states:
The Statute of Anne is usually thought of as having vested the
copyright of works in their authors; and, superficially, the language
of the statute conveys the idea that the act was especially to benefit
authors. It did enable authors for the first time to acquire the
copyright of their works, and to this extent, it was a benefit to them.
. . . Emphasis on the author in the Statute of Anne implying that the
statutory copyright was an author’s copyright was more a matter of
form than of substance. The monopolies at which the statute was
aimed were too long established to be attacked without some basis
for change. The most logical and natural basis for the changes was
the author. Although the author had never held copyright, his interest
was always promoted by the stationers as a means to their end. Their
arguments had been, essentially, that without order in the trade
provided by copyright, publishers would not publish books, and
therefore would not pay authors for their manuscripts. The draftsmen
of the Statute of Anne put these arguments to use, and the author was
used primarily as a weapon against monopoly.
Id. at 145–47.
140
Augustine Birrell states:
[The Statute of Anne] gave away the whole case of the British author,
for amidst all the judicial differences during the last century on
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with economic privileges prevents a proper legal analysis of
author’s rights and the notion of creative authorship in a way that
is independent of the economics of the commercial marketplace.
As Professor Patterson explains, copyright
was to become a concept to embrace all the rights to
be had in connection with published works, either
by the author or publisher. As such, it was to
prevent a recognition of the different interests of the
two and thus preclude the development of a
satisfactory law to protect the interests of the author
as author.141
Judicial decisions appearing to deny the existence of the
author’s rights served to further entrench these natural property
entitlements of an author within the statutory framework for
copyright. Publishers started to promote the idea that authors had
natural rights in their creation that were independent of the Statute
of Anne to provide the basis for a perpetual copyright to publish
and sell books as assignees of the author’s right.142 In Millar v.
Taylor,143 the publishers sought to establish a perpetual common
law copyright for the author to prolong the publisher’s statutory
protection, which had expired under the Statute of Anne.144 The
case was an action brought by one publisher, Andrew Millar,
against another, Robert Taylor, and did not involve authors,
although the assertion of the booksellers that they derived their
rights from the author’s common law rights, the basis for their
asserting a perpetual right to publish books,145 put authors’ rights
in their literary and artistic creations at the center of the dispute.
The Court of King’s Bench ruled that authors had a copyright at

copyright there was a steady majority of judges in favor of the view
that but for the Statute of Anne an author was entitled to perpetual
copyright in his published work. This right (if it ever existed) the Act
destroyed.
AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, SEVEN LECTURES ON THE LAW AND HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT
BOOKS 21–22 (Rothman Reprints 1971) (1899).
141
PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT, supra note 7, at 151.
142
Id. at 158.
143
Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303 (K.B. 1796).
144
PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT, supra note 7, at 168.
145
Id. at 168–69.
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common law that the Statute of Anne did not take away,
recognizing that authors had certain natural rights in the works that
they create.146 The House of Lords’ decision in Donaldson v.
Beckett147 five years later overruled Millar v. Taylor and decided
that the author’s common law right to the sole printing, publishing,
and vending of his works was replaced by the Statute of Anne.148
The case of Donaldson v. Beckett is generally taken to represent
the proposition that an author’s right at common law was abolished
by the Statute of Anne and that the only rights authors had over the
work was a statutory one.149 Professor Patterson argues that the
court treated the author’s perpetual common law right as
supplanted by the Statute of Anne to address the monopoly of
publishers over the book trade.150 By acknowledging that an
146

Lord Mansfield based his decision on the justice of recognizing an author’s right:
It is just that an author should reap the pecuniary profits of his own
ingenuity and labour. It is just, that another should not use his name,
without his consent. It is fit, that he should judge when to publish, or
whether he ever will publish. It is fit he should not only choose the
time, but the manner of publication; how many; what volume; what
print. It is fit, he should choose to whose care he will trust the
accuracy and correctness of the impression; in whose honesty he will
confide, not to foist in additions: with other reasonings of the same
effect. . . . But the same reasons hold, after the author has published.
He can reap no pecuniary profit, if, the next moment after his work
comes out, it may be pirated upon worse paper and in worse print,
and in a cheaper volume.
Millar, 4 Burr. 2303, 2398. Justice Yates dissented in this decision. Justice Yates said
this of the common-law property right in literary works claimed by the booksellers:
[B]ut the property claimed here is all ideal; a set of ideas which have
no bounds or marks whatever, nothing that is capable of a visible
possession, nothing that can sustain any one of the qualities or
incidents of property. Their whole existence is in the mind alone;
incapable of any other modes of acquisition or enjoyment, than by
mental possession or apprehension; safe and invulnerable, from their
own immateriality: no trespass can reach them; no tort affect them;
no fraud or violence damage or affect them. Yet, these are the
phantoms which the author would grasp and confine to himself: and
these are what the defendant is charged with having robbed the
plaintiff of.
Millar, 4 Burr. 2303, 2362 (Yates, J., dissenting).
147
Donaldson v. Beckett, 4 Burr. 2408 (H.L. 1774).
148
PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT, supra note 7, at 174.
149
Id. at 173.
150
Id. at 174–75.
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author had a right at common law and deciding that the right was
replaced by a statutory right limited in duration, the court
effectively prevented publishers from claiming that they were
assignees of a perpetual common law authorial right that would
allow their continuous monopoly over the publication of books.151
Aimed directly at destroying the publishers’ monopoly by
discarding the author’s common law copyright,152 the decision of
Donaldson v. Beckett had the effect of merging the author’s natural
rights in the creation of a work with that of the limited right to
print provided under the Statute of Anne, leading to a fallacious
understanding that the author had no other rights over the work
other than the limited rights provided by the Statute of Anne to
profit from the publication and sale of the work.153
151

For a treatment of the legal questions before the House of Lords, see id. at 175–79.
Lord Camden, in giving his decision, stated that unless the publisher’s monopoly
was limited “[a]ll our learning will be looked up in the hands of the Tonsons and Lintons
of the age, who will set what price upon which their avarice chuses to demand, till the
public becomes as much their slaves, as their own hackney compilers are.” Id. at 178.
Lord Chief Justice De Grey also noted that the publisher’s use of the author’s common
law right was a way to prolong their monopoly. His Lordship stated:
The truth is, the idea of a common-law right in perpetuity was not
taken up until after that failure (of the booksellers) in procuring a new
statute for the enlargement of the term. If (say the parties concerned)
the legislature will not do it for us, we will do it without their
assistance; and then we begin to hear of this new doctrine, the
common-law right, which, upon the whole, I am of opinion, cannot
be supported upon any rules or principles of the common law of this
kingdom.
Id.
153
Professor Patterson explains:
If the author no longer had the common-law right to publish, and was
denied common-law remedies, the conclusion that he had no rights
except those provided by the statute is almost self evident. The
fallacy in this conclusion, of course, is that the court and the Statute
of Anne did not purport to deal with anything more than the
copyright in its most limited form. But the fallacy was obscured by
the conclusion that except when the author complied with the terms
of the statute, publication resulted in a gift of the work to the public.
As long as the relationship was between the author and publisher—
that is, a two dimensional affair—it was fairly easy to say that the
author retained certain rights upon selling the copy. The making of a
gift of the work to the public, however, resulted in the inference of an
abdication of all rights.
Id. at 176.
152
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Sixty years later, in Wheaton v. Peters,154 the United States
Supreme Court faced the identical question that was before the
courts in Millar v. Taylor and Donaldson v. Beckett on whether the
author possessed a common law right in the work that was
independent of the statutory rights under the Copyright Act of
1790.155 The Copyright Act of 1790, the first copyright statute
passed in accordance with Congress’s constitutional powers, was
an act for the encouragement of learning156 by granting printing,
reprinting, publishing or vending rights over maps, charts and
books to authors and proprietors.157 Like the Statute of Anne, the
proprietor of a work is treated as being on the same footing as the
author, and the rights provided for, which were wholly statutory
and not based on any natural rights that the author had over the
work, were regarded to be all the rights that the author would have
in his or her work after its publication.158 Wheaton v. Peters
affirmed this view when Justice M’Lean, writing for the majority,
asserted that an author’s literary property can only be claimed by
statute:
[A]n author, at common law, has a property in his
manuscript, and may obtain redress against any one
who deprives him of it, or by improperly obtaining
a copy endeavours to realise a profit by its
publication, cannot be doubted; but this is a very
different right from that which asserts a perpetual
154

Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834).
See id. at 608.
156
Only the title of the Act mentions learning. The protection of the author and the
promotion of learning were secondary to the ideas that copyright is a government grant
and a monopoly. PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT, supra note 7, at 198.
157
See Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (May 31, 1790) (repealed 1909).
158
The Act was generally restrictive in nature. Provisions in the Act provided for
restrictive limitations, limited the benefits to citizens and residents of the United States,
required actions to be brought within a one-year limitation and legalized the piracy of
foreign works. PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT, supra note 7, at 200. According to Professor
Patterson:
[I]t is difficult to come to any conclusion except that the copyright
provided for was wholly statutory, without any reliance upon natural
rights of the author. The conclusion that inevitably follows is that the
copyright under the federal act did not . . . merely affirm and protect
rights of the author; it created them.
Id.
155
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and exclusive property in the future publication of
the work, after the author shall have published it to
the world.159
Justice M’Lean goes on to state further that “[t]he argument
that a literary man is as much entitled to the product of his labour
as any other member of society, cannot be controverted. And the
answer is, that he realises this product by the transfer of his
manuscripts, or in the sale of his works, when first published.”160
To Justice M’Lean, Congress, in passing the 1790 Act, “did not
legislate in reference to existing rights”161 and that “Congress . . .
instead of sanctioning an existing right, as contended for, created
it.”162
The decision of Wheaton v. Peters—that copyright was
statutorily created and had not originated at common law—set the
trajectory for the development of copyright jurisprudence that is
today based entirely on positive, as opposed to, natural law.163
Professor Patterson and Stanley Lindberg argue that the decision
was too simplistic a solution to a complex problem in which the
publishers sought monopoly over the publication of books based
on the fallacy that the ownership of the copyright is the same as the
ownership of the work.164 Without resolving the question of how
an author’s interest in the work can be protected without giving

159

Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 657.
Id.
161
Id. at 661.
162
Id.
163
Marci A. Hamilton, Copyright at the Supreme Court: A Jurisprudence of Deference,
47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 317, 324–25 (2000). Professor Hamilton notes that the
Court in Wheaton v. Peters precluded natural law considerations in copyright law in its
refusal to consider the application of English copyright law in the United States, basing
its decision on a theory or philosophy that would trump statutory law (John Locke’s
theory of property was widely available and discussed at the time of the decision) or give
the Courts greater judicial power to interpret the Constitution’s copyright clause. Id.
Professor Hamilton states that “[b]y explicitly and firmly placing copyright law in the
hands of Congress, the Court’s reading of the Copyright Clause in Wheaton v. Peters
distanced federal copyright law from any necessary connection to natural law. . . . [T]hat
copyright law is, first and foremost, statutory law.” Id.
164
L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW
OF USERS’ RIGHTS 64 (Univ. of Ga. Press 1991) [hereinafter PATTERSON & LINDBERG,
THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT].
160
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publishers their desired market monopoly,165 the decision in
Wheaton v. Peters set the tone for future copyright thinking by
indicating that the natural rights of authors in their creative works
are the same economic statutory rights that copyright proprietors
possess to publish and distribute works in the form of a narrow
“copyright” or right to copy.166
However, the distinction between the natural rights of the
individual author and the economic statutory rights of the
publisher, or copyright proprietor, is an important distinction that
ought not to be ignored in copyright jurisprudence because both
authors and publishers serve entirely different purposes within the
copyright system and are encouraged by entirely different values in
making literary and artistic works available to the public. The
early separation of authors from their publishers and the bookprinting business in England prior to the Statute of Anne167 and the
wholesale manner in which rights to print and vend a particular
manuscript was transferred to the publisher168 indicated separate

165

Patterson and Lindberg contend:
[T]he Wheaton case suffered from the defect of its virtue, for its
holding was a simplistic solution to a complex problem: How to
protect the author’s interest in his or her work without at the same
time providing the bookseller an unregulated monopoly. This
monopoly, of course, is based on the fallacy that ownership of the
work is ownership of the copyright and vice versa, which can be
traced to the Millar and Donaldson cases.

Id.
166

Professor Alfred Yen argues:
Like Donaldson, Wheaton can be read as requiring the elimination of
copyright’s natural law dimensions in favor of increasing emphasis
on copyright’s economic theory. First, Wheaton explicitly disavowed
the existence of common law copyright, which was based in the
natural law. Second, Wheaton’s rejection of common law copyright
meant that the federal copyright statute became the only source of
copyright protection for a published work. Since the federal statute
arose under constitutional authority to promote the useful arts, it
seemed natural for courts to adopt this purpose as copyright’s guiding
principle.
Alfred Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST.
L.J. 517, 530 (1990).
167
See PATTERSON & LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT, supra note 164, at 112.
168
See id. at 113–14.
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and distinct interests in a work that persists even today.169 The
author-publisher relationship, one that exists between the creator of
a literary and artistic work and the entrepreneur, is a necessary
relationship to bring a completed work to the public.170 While an
author invests creative resources, individual expression and
personal authorship in creating and producing a work, it is the
publisher who invests financially to print or publish a work and
distributes it to the public.171
Professor Patterson’s historical documentation on the legal
development of copyright as a narrow right of the publishers to
print, publish and profit from the work, pertaining only to an
economic interest in the work provided for by statute, provides an
important perspective on the nature of an author’s right.172
Originating in individual creativity and authorship and separate
from a narrow right to print and publish that may be assigned to a
publisher, the author’s natural rights to the work are outside the
ambit of the statutory copyright,173 rights which ought to be
understood as an affirmation of the author’s economic interest but
169

See William Cornish, The Authors as Risk-Sharer, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 2
(2002) (“[T]he entrepreneurs have secured copyright in the name of the author but use
their contractual deals to reap most of the advantages from the exclusive right. So it was
in the beginning, with the clique of London booksellers who secured the Statute of Anne
in 1710, and so no doubt it ever shall be.”).
170
Maureen A. O’Rourke, A Brief History of Author-Publisher Relations and the
Outlook for the 21st Century, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 425, 426 (2003) (“[T]he
relationship between authors and their publishers . . . largely determines who creates what
types of copyrighted works and whether those works’ distribution promotes the public
welfare.”).
171
Professor Cornish calls the author the “literary or artistic creator” and refers to the
publisher or producer as the “entrepreneur who contracts to bring the work to the public
in one or other form.” Cornish, supra note 169, at 2.
172
See PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT, supra note 7, at 77.
173
Professor Patterson argues:
The evidence available to us clearly indicates that the stationers
recognized the author’s property rights. They recognized also other
rights of the author, rights which can be called creative rights,
although the term undoubtedly did not occur to them. That such
rights may not have been fully developed need hardly concern us, for
their existence at all shows that the stationers were aware of the
continuing interest of the author in his works by reason of the fact
that he created them. And it is this point which confirms the other
evidence as to the limited scope of the stationer’s copyright.
Id.
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not the entire set of rights in a work. In light of the historical
development of copyright, the much wider natural rights that
authors have, besides the limited economic rights provided to them
and proprietors of their work under copyright statutes, provide the
basis for which property entitlements may be recognized. Without
undermining society’s right to access creative works, the rights of
authors may be separated from the rights of publishers/distributors.
The rights authors have as property entitlements arise from their
individual creativity and authorship; economic privileges
statutorily created to ensure publication and dissemination of
creative works to the public, on the other hand, are granted to
publishers and distributors of creative works to provide investment
incentives to publishing and distributing the work to society as a
matter of public policy. These rights work to encourage the
creation, publication and distribution of creative works to the
public. By recognizing three parties to the copyright system—
authors, readers and publishers/distributors—the copyright system
may allocate entitlements in literary and artistic works among them
in a manner that is fair and just in accordance with a social
agreement to a civil copyright society. A fair and just allocation of
entitlements will not be possible unless: the author is recognized as
being a separate individual possessing property entitlements in his
or her creations within the copyright system; readers are
acknowledged as being entitled to literary and artistic works that
contribute to knowledge and the pursuit of excellence and access to
a pool of creative resources for learning and education; and
publishers/distributors are entitled to recover their financial
investments in publishing and distributing works to the public. It
is only when these different rights are properly recognized through
the copyright system that authentic authorship can occur in a
manner that ultimately benefits society.
II. NATURAL LAW, NATURAL RIGHTS AND COPYRIGHT
Understanding authors’ rights as being the same as the
economic rights of publishers, granted by way of statutory
provisions, may be the primary reason for a failure to see authors
as individuals possessing rights because of their creative
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authorship, rights not granted by way of statute in accordance with
constitutional goals and congressional policies to “promote the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts”174 in society. As a result
of this understanding, copyright and literary scholars argue that the
notion of authorship has become a cultural, political, economic and
social construction that persisted in copyright jurisprudence
because of the way judges and scholars came to view creative
authorship as an “uncritically accepted notion” that is “grounded
on an uncritical belief in the existence of a distinct and privileged
category of activity, that generates products of special social value,
entitling the practitioners (the ‘authors’) to unique reward.”175
The aim of this Article is to suggest otherwise—that a critical
examination of the historical trajectory of copyright law and the
notion of the romantic author and creative authorship reveals a
separate and distinct role that authors have in the copyright system,
a role which necessitates the recognition of their individual rights
as existing independently against the utilitarian goals and aims of
the copyright system. Property rights in literary and artistic works
ought to only be owned by authors by virtue of their creative
authorship, with rights over the use of these works allocated within
the copyright system in accordance with contractarian notions of
justice and fairness. As “the Progress of Science and the useful
Arts”176 is dependent on the works that authors produce and create
for society, authors are therefore under a moral or ethical
obligation to society to produce and create for the common good of
society. The allocation of rights over literary and artistic works
must therefore be premised on theories of natural law and natural
rights that recognize both property rights that authors have over the
works by virtue of their creative authorship and the rights society
possesses to use those works for development and growth.177 Part

174

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of Authorship, 1991
DUKE L.J. 455, 459–66 (1991).
176
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
177
Wendy Gordon, A Property Right in Self Expression: Equality and Individualism in
the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1535 (1993) [hereinafter
Gordon, A Property Right]. Professor Gordon argues that a natural rights theory can
protect both the interests of authors and the public:
175
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II of this Article builds on the discussion of Part I, which
establishes the centrality of authors and creative authorship in the
copyright system, by setting the foundations for authorial property
rights in natural rights theory, and proceeds to discuss how moral
rights support these natural rights of authors and the process of
creative authorship within a copyright system. Part II of this
Article also considers the natural rights of society to the pursuit of
knowledge and excellence that is made possible through literary
and artistic works as well as society’s right to access these works
for progress and development, and the manner in which these
public interests ought to be balanced against the rights of authors.
A. Property Rights in Literary and Artistic Works
The most commonly cited natural law theory supporting
property rights in intellectual property is John Locke’s perspective
that one who mixes individual labor with what nature has provided
acquires property in what is produced.178 Locke’s reasoning that
men may, by natural reason, make use of all things that are
common to all men to improve the conditions of life through the
“Labour of his body” and “Work of his hands” and obtain property
in that which he has mixed his labor with179 provides a unique
theory of property that supports the grant of strong intellectual
property rights to creators and authors as those who use creative
materials common to all creators and authors to produce something
new.180 Conceiving property rights in literary and artistic works

Natural rights theory . . . is necessarily concerned with the rights of
the public as well as with the rights of those whose labors create
intellectual products. When the limitations in natural law’s premises
are taken seriously, natural rights not only cease to be a weapon
against free expression; they also become a source of affirmative
protection for free speech interests.
Id.
178

Benjamin G. Damstedt, Limiting Locke: A Natural Law Justification for the Fair
Use Doctrine, 112 YALE L.J. 1179, 1179–81 (2003).
179
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, bk. II, § 27 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1967) (1690).
180
Gordon, A Property Right, supra note 177, at 1540 (“Locke’s labor theory of
property and allied approaches have been used so frequently as a justification for
creators’ ownership rights that Locke’s Two Treatises have been erroneously credited
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via Locke’s natural law philosophy offers a compelling alternative
to copyright analysis that focuses on an individual author’s
creative efforts, and values authorship as an activity that is, in
deontological terminology, a good in itself.181 A natural law
analysis of the copyright system that is independent of the
economics of the commercial market removes from copyright
jurisprudence the difficulties associated with setting the balance
between private rights and social goals that is necessary in a
copyright system founded on utilitarian principles.182
Reliance on Locke’s theory of property raises two fundamental
points about the centrality of authors and the notion of creative
authorship to the copyright system as an institution to encourage
authorship. First, Locke’s idea that authors may acquire property
rights in things common to nature with which they merge
individual labor supports a notion of authorship that reflects the
reality of authorial creativity as a socially interdependent activity
that draws inspiration from ideas and works that surround an
author.183 An author may use the works of and be inspired by the
creative expressions of other authors and creators and still satisfy
the requirements of originality and creativity in his own work of

with having developed an explicit defense of intellectual property.” (footnotes omitted)).
181
See Yen, supra note 166, at 517.
182
Id. at 539. Professor Yen notes the inherent difficulties of economic analysis of the
copyright system:
The normative use of economics in copyright suffers from, among
other things, the problems inherent in defining and measuring
society’s welfare. To be sure, certain components may be known in a
general fashion, but constructing a scale which successfully measures
the existence and value of each of these components is impossible.
Indeed, the very construction of such a scale would certainly involve
the identification and evaluation of rights implicit in natural law
reasoning. This realization alone weakens the basis for grounding
copyright theory in economics alone.
Id.
183
See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 300
(1988) (“A society that believes ideas come to people as manna from heaven must look
somewhere other than Locke to justify the establishment of intellectual property. The
labor theory of property does not work if one subscribes to a pure ‘eureka’ theory of
ideas.”).
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authorship to acquire property rights in the work created.184 As
authors depend on works of other authors to produce their own
original and creative works of authorship, they bear a moral and
ethical obligation to other authors to ensure the same freedom and
rights to access their own works to encourage creative authorship
in other authors and creators. Second, Locke’s theory of property
incorporates moral and ethical limitations into the natural rights of
man to acquire property rights over that in nature which he has
improved upon, and authorial property rights over literary and
artistic works, by virtue of these limitations, are therefore not
absolute but rather subjected to natural law restraints. These moral
and ethical limitations in Locke’s theory are twofold. The first
limitation is that man’s acquisition of property by labor must leave
“enough, and as good left,” in the common for others to use, for
Locke reasons that someone who “leaves as much as another can
make use of, does as good as take[s] nothing at all.”185 This
limitation provides a natural limitation to the acquisition of rights
that is determined by whether enough is left in the common for
others to use and improve upon. If society’s ability to use things in
the common is significantly reduced by the grant of property
rights, natural law will prohibit the recognition of the right,186 and
when applied to authorial rights, this proviso in Locke’s theory
introduces a moral and ethical limitation that sets the extent to
which property rights over literary and artistic works may reach.
The second natural law limitation in Locke’s theory on the exercise
of property rights is the waste prohibition that forbids waste of

184
Yen, supra note 166, at 554 (“[A]uthors do not truly labor alone. Although it is
certainly true that authors are extremely gifted and industrious, the popular vision of
authors as people who create new things from nothing is simply false. No author has
lived an entire life on a proverbial desert island. Instead, authors live and work as
members of an artistic community and a broader society whose creations, values and
experiences form an integral part of the author’s creative vision. Authorship is therefore
not the creation of works which spring like Athena from the head of Zeus, but the
conscious and unconscious intake, digestion and transformation of input gained from the
author’s experience within a broader society.”).
185
LOCKE, supra note 179, bk. II, § 33.
186
Gordon, A Property Right, supra note 177, at 1563–64 (“[C]reators should have
property in their original works, only provided that such grant of property does no harm
to other persons’ equal abilities to create or to draw upon the preexisting cultural matrix
and scientific heritage. All persons are equal and have an equal right to the common.”).
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things in the common. While Locke believed that God gave the
world to all men in common for their benefit and to support life,187
he also believed that men have a moral responsibility to society to
use things in the common in a way that would enrich their lives
and not cause prejudice to others,188 for to waste things in the
common would deprive others of their equal share to things in the
common.189 As the wasted property may be the “Possession of any
other,”190 authors have a moral and ethical obligation to use works
of their creation in a way that would generate benefit or value, or
stand to lose property rights in their work.191 An author who
creates a work and attaches no value to it loses property rights in
the work by virtue of Locke’s waste prohibition.192 In the
copyright system, this limitation on property rights is particularly
important in the law’s approach to the treatment of orphan
works—literary and artistic works whose owners cannot be
identified or located after a reasonable search—as society will be
entitled to use these works without fear of infringing the property
rights of the copyright owner.193
187

See LOCKE, supra note 179, bk. II, § 32.
See id. §§ 33–34.
189
Id. §§ 37–38. Locke states that if products of nature perished in the possession of
one man without use, it would be an offense against “the common law of Nature” and he
would be “liable to be punished”:
[For] he invaded his neighbour’s share, for he had no Right farther
than his Use called for any of them, and they might serve to afford
him Conveniences of Life. . . . [I]f either the Grass of his Inclosure
rotted on the Ground, or the Fruit of his planting perished without
gathering and laying up, this part of the Earth, not withstanding his
Inclosure, was still to be looked on as Waste, and might be the
Possession of any other.
Id.
190
Id.
191
Damstedt, supra note 178, at 1195 (“[A]n individual who polices the waste
prohibition can be said to have done as good as take nothing at all from the owner.”).
192
Id. at 1195–96.
193
For treatment of orphan works in the copyright system, see, for example, Mark. H.
Greenberg, Reason or Madness: A Defense of Copyright Growing Pains, 7 J. MARSHALL
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (2007) (considering the issues pertaining to orphan works and
offering an analysis and critique of the pending Orphan Works Act 2006); Mark Lemley,
Should a Licensing Market Require Licensing?, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 202
(2007) (applying a compensatory remedy approach to orphan works); Joshua O.
Mausner, Copyright Orphan Works: A Multi-Pronged Solution to Solve a Harmful
Market Inefficiency, 12 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 395 (2007) (proposing solutions to the
188
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A deontological theory of copyright law will also include,
besides the labor theory of property, a personality-based
philosophy that justifies an author’s entitlement to property rights
in his or her creation because the work manifests the author’s
personality or self.194 Steeped in continental thinking on the
author’s moral rights over literary and artistic creations, the
personality philosophy is best known through the work of Georg
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, who believed that a person’s personality
was “that which struggles to lift itself above this restriction [of
being only subjective] and to give itself reality, or in other words
to claim that external world as its own.”195 In light of this
philosophy of property as a person’s entitlement to control
resources in his or her external environment, an entitlement closely
linked to his or her personality, Margaret Radin argues that a
hierarchy of entitlements and a spectrum of rights of different
strengths will emerge depending on how closely connected an
entitlement is to a person’s personality.196 If literary and artistic
works are, as John Milton says, the “precious life blood” of an
author that is “embalmed and treasured up on purpose to a life
orphan works problem); David Sherman, Cost and Resource Allocation Under the
Orphan Works Act of 2006: Would the Act Reduce Transaction Costs, Allocate Orphan
Works Efficiently, and Serve the Goals of Copyright Law?, 12 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4 (2007)
(highlighting how the goals of the copyright system are undermined by the presence of
orphan works and describing the economic and cultural costs associated with these
works); Rebecca Tushnet, Naming Rights: Attribution and Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 789
(favoring legislation reform to address orphan works).
194
Hughes, supra note 183, at 330.
195
Id. (quoting G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 39 (T.M. Knox trans., 1967) (1821)).
196
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 986 (1982).
Professor Radin envisions rights form a continuum from fungible to personal depending
on the relationship of a particular right to personhood:
A general justification of property entitlements in terms of their
relationship to personhood could hold that the rights that come within
the general justification form a continuum from fungible to personal.
It then might hold that those rights near one end of the continuum—
fungible property rights—can be overridden in some cases in which
those near the other—personal property rights—cannot be. This is to
argue not that fungible property rights are unrelated to personhood,
but simply that distinctions are sometimes warranted depending upon
the character or strength of the connection. Thus, the personhood
perspective generates a hierarchy of entitlements: The more closely
connected with personhood, the stronger the entitlement.
Id.
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beyond life,”197 it necessarily follows that authors ought to have
strong property rights in their creations if they represent an
author’s most intimate being. Creators of literary and artistic
works, because of this close relationship between person and work,
ought not be separated. This inseparability of person and work
forms the basis for moral rights protection in works.198 Moral
rights, in a copyright system based on moral and ethical
philosophy, are necessary to support creative authorship and
encourage authors to create literary and artistic works by assuring
authors that the integrity of their works and personality will be
protected by the law.199
B. Moral Rights
The present function of the copyright system, aimed to protect
the economic interests of copyright owners by facilitating market
transactions for creative works, serves to discourage authors from
creative authorship where the law fails to adequately acknowledge
an author’s non-economic interests or moral rights in a work. The
attribution society makes to an author for a work created, or the
respect society shows an author by not mutilating or using the
work in derogatory ways, may mean more to an author than the
financial rewards that commercialization of the work may reap.200
Encouraging creative authorship in society through the copyright
system necessitates the acknowledgement of moral rights of
authors in their creation for two reasons. The first reason to
acknowledge the moral rights of authors is that authors, more often
than not, write and create for personal non-economic gains, and an
197

Milton, supra note 57, at 342.
See Linda Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyright, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532, 1542
(1989) (“The personhood theory of intellectual property thus supports not only the idea of
copyright in artistic products, but also the idea of moral rights.”).
199
See id. at 1548–49.
200
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and The Moral Right: Is an American
Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1985) (“Because copyright law protects
works that are the product of the creator’s mind, heart, and soul, a degree of protection in
addition to that which guarantees financial returns is warranted. The 1976 Act does not
purport to protect the creator, but rather the copyright owner. Nevertheless, a creator,
regardless of whether he holds the copyright in his work, has a personal interest in
preserving the artistic integrity of his work and compelling recognition for his
authorship.”).
198
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acknowledgement of moral rights recognizes an author’s
individual expression of personality in the creative process of
authorship that is separate from the economic right in a work.201
By protecting an author’s personal expression in a work and
regarding literary and artistic works as an inalienable extension of
an author’s personality that entitles an author to restrict uses of the
work by blocking publication of the work—determining the
manner in which authorship is attributed and preventing material
changes and uses of the work in ways that contradict the author’s
artistic vision, even after the exclusive right to market the work has
been granted to another202—moral rights jurisdictions in the
continental tradition assure authors of the protection of their
personal dignity and individual personality that is expressed in
their creations.203 By protecting the moral rights of authors,
copyright law ensures that an author’s personal integrity remains
intact after the creation is made available to the public and this, as
a result, encourages the kind of authentic authorship that
contributes to the pursuit of excellence within society.
The second reason that necessitates the protection of the moral
rights of authors affirms a natural right of individuals within
society to pursue knowledge and excellence as a human good. By
recognizing moral rights of authors, society is ensured of works of
authentic authorship that are of significant value to authors and
201
Edward Damich, The Right of Personality: A Common Law Basis for the Protection
of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (1988). In explaining the
theoretical basis for the French droit moral, Professor Damich cites Joseph Kohler’s
dualist theory of author’s rights that a work is the expression of the author’s personality
with a property aspect to it that signifies the work’s economic value:
According to Kohler the author creates a work of art and thus projects
his personality into it. The work also has an economic value which
can be commercially exploited and is treated like property. The
work, however, still remains the projection of the author’s
personality, which, as the primary value, must take precedence over
the economic aspect.
Id.
202
Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in
United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 2
(1994).
203
Kwall, supra note 126, at 23 (“The various components of the moral rights doctrine
reflect the unmistakable reality that this doctrine is concerned with protecting the author’s
personal dignity and the human spirit reflected in her artistic creations.”).
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their readers, as authors who are assured of the protection of their
personal artistic integrity are more likely to invest their individual
personality and creativity in producing literary and artistic works
that resonate with the human soul. The inspiration, solace and
wisdom that readers of all generations find in great works of
authentic authorship stem from the creativity of authors and writers
who had the courage to pursue the inner promptings of their
individual personality and as a result, make a marked contribution
to society. There is a natural inclination for the human mind to
always return to its need for “beauty, truth and insight,” as Harold
Bloom reminds us,204 and the acknowledgement of an author’s
moral rights in works assures society of creations that embody the
beauty, truth and insight that represents the author’s authentic self.
C. Rights to Pursue Knowledge and Excellence
Natural rights of individuals within society, predicated on a
theory of natural law, exist to equip every human person with the
right to make decisions to fulfill their highest potential.205 Natural
law philosophers adhere to the belief that there are basic human
goods that are common to all men,206 which if pursued within a
legal system, allow men to achieve their highest moral potential207
and maintain a cohesive social order within society.208 By
204

HAROLD BLOOM, WHERE SHALL WISDOM BE FOUND? 1 (Riverhead Books 2004).
JACQUES MARITAIN, NATURAL LAW: REFLECTIONS ON THEORY & PRACTICE 77 (St.
Augustine Press 2001) (“Every human person has the right to make its own decisions
with regard to its personal destiny, whether it be a question of choosing one’s work, of
marrying the man or woman of one’s choice or of pursuing a religious vocation.”).
206
Id. at 77–78. These rights include fundamental human rights such as “the right to
existence and life; the right to personal freedom,” the right “to conduct one’s own life as
master of oneself and of one’s acts,” the right to pursue “a moral and rational human
life,” the right to pursue the eternal good, “the right to keep one’s body whole,” the right
to property, the right to marry and raise a family and the right to free association. Id.
207
ROBERT GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL 1 (Oxford Univ. Press 1993) (explaining
that traditional natural law thinking on morality, politics and law maintains that law has a
legitimate role to help people make themselves moral by preventing self corruption of
men who act upon a choice to indulge in immoral activities, preventing the emulation of
this behavior by others, preserving the “moral ecology in which people make their
morally self-constituting choices” and educating people about what is morally wrong and
right).
208
JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 217 (Oxford Univ. Press 1980)
(“[P]ublic order . . . concerns the maintenance . . . of the physical environment and
205
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encouraging authentic authorship through copyright laws, a greater
amount of creative works manifesting the genuine expressions of
an author’s artistic personality will be produced, presenting
individuals in society with a plethora of literary and artistic choices
as to what to read and pursue. These choices individuals within
society have as a result of a copyright system that encourages
authentic authorship protect and validate the natural right of
individuals to pursue knowledge and excellence as basic human
goods that are inherently good in themselves. Whether individuals
within society make this choice to pursue knowledge and
excellence209 is a question that the law may not be equipped to deal
with, for the imposition of moral choices upon individuals in
society may cause deleterious results.210 However, by presenting
these choices, the law adopts a moral standpoint that affirms the
natural right of individuals within society to pursue knowledge and
excellence as a chosen activity.211
Incorporating natural rights of individuals to the pursuit of
knowledge and excellence into the copyright system introduces a
moral and ethical dimension to the law that sets certain boundaries
around how an author’s property and moral rights in literary and
artistic works may arise. An author’s use of materials in the

structure of expectations and reliances essential to the well being of all members of a
community, especially the weak. Inciting hatred amongst sections of the community is
not merely an injury to the rights of those hated; it threatens everyone in the community
with a future of violence and of other violations of right, and this threat is itself an injury
to the common good and is reasonably referred to as a violation of public order.”).
209
Id. at 65. Professor Finnis argues that not everyone recognizes the value of
knowledge, or that there are no “pre-conditions” for the recognition of that value. He
explains that “[t]he principle that truth (and knowledge) is worth pursuing is not
somehow innate, inscribed in the mind at birth.” Id.
210
The question of whether copyright law may impose upon individuals the duty to
pursue a morally worthy activity and whether people have a “right to do wrong” is a
controversial question that natural law theorists grapple with. For the ongoing debate on
this issue, see generally GEORGE, supra note 207, at 110–28.
211
By encouraging works of authentic authorship, the law presents individuals with a
choice to pursue an activity that contributes towards the development of their best
individual moral potential. As Harold Bloom reminds us, “[i]t matters, if individuals are
to retain any capacity to form their own judgments and opinions, that they continue to
read for themselves. How they read, well or badly, and what they read cannot depend
wholly upon themselves, but why they read must be for their own interest.” HAROLD
BLOOM, HOW TO READ AND WHY 21 (Simon & Schuster 2000).
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common to create literary and artistic works ought to be such that
it corresponds with society’s right to pursue knowledge and
excellence through his or her work. Besides the “enough, and as
good left” and “prohibition against waste” conditions setting
limitations to an author’s rights in Locke’s theory of property,212
recognizing society’s right to the pursuit of knowledge and
excellence through an author’s work also creates a corresponding
moral and ethical obligation upon authors to produce works that
would contribute to that purpose. These natural rights of
individuals in society ought to also create a moral and ethical
obligation on authors to create works that are an authentic
expression and reflection of their personality and artistic soul for
moral rights to be acknowledged and protected.
D. Rights to Access Literary and Artistic Works
Copyright scholarship on society’s rights to access literary and
artistic works for the creation of new works, education, research,
cultural growth and development, and artistic and literary
inspiration is both rich and abundant.213 The present copyright
system, requiring the maximization of the aggregate amount of
collective social welfare as a normative utilitarian aim,214 seeks to
assure society of access to literary and artistic works through the
efficient allocation of entitlements in the commercial market.215
However, the incommensurability of values attached to creative
authorship,216 difficulties with calibrating the right amount of
entitlements
between
authors,
readers
and
publishers/distributors,217 and the market failures that usually

212

LOCKE, supra note 179, bk. II, §§ 33, 38.
See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURES AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
(Penguin Press 2004) [Hereinafter LESSIG, FREE CULTURE]; LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE
FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (Random House
2001) [Hereinafter LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS]; Kreiss, supra note 29; Lemley,
Property, supra note 29; Litman, The Public Domain, supra note 65; Netanel, Copyright,
supra note 20.
214
Ghosh, supra note 109, at 870.
215
Trosow, supra note 40, at 227.
216
See Sunstein, supra note 124, at 799.
217
See Nachbar, supra note 27, at 278.
213
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accompany intangible goods such as creative works218 make it
difficult to facilitate fair consensual exchanges of entitlements
between copyright owners and the public in the market.219
The ethical and moral dimension to copyright law cannot be
ignored if we are serious about creating literary and artistic works
for social progress and cultural development.220 The notion of
romantic authorship focuses on the process of creativity, the
process of using works from the commons to reach new
grounds,221 as that which is deserving of an entitlement. The focus
218

See Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 32, at 1613.
David McGowan, Copyright Nonconsequentialism, 69 MO. L. REV. 1, 11 (2004).
The chance of possessing market power, for example, could impede fair exchanges of
entitlements. As Professor McGowan explains:
For works the public demands, and for which there are imperfect
substitutes, copyright offers authors a chance at some degree of
market power. There may be very few such works, so the discounted
value of that power might be very modest. It is still possible, though,
that the lure of market power causes authors to invest too many
resources in prospecting for copyright riches.
Id.
220
ROSEMARY COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES 54 (Duke
Univ. Press 1998) (“Scholars have shown how our intellectual property laws—copyright
in particular—have developed without due regard for the public interest, ignoring our
social interests in freedom of speech, promoting expressive activity, or protecting the
public domain.”).
221
Ghosh, supra note 109, at 861. Professor Ghosh tells the fable of the intellectual
property commons to describe the use of creative materials that, unlike the commons that
Garrett Hardin envisioned, is not prone to depletion and overuse. Professor Ghosh’s
fable is as follows:
Imagine a denizen of the commons. One day she looks out beyond
the pastures shared with her fellow residents to the ocean that
surrounds the communal island. She sees what at first looks like an
optical illusion, the play of clouds and water, but what slowly reveals
the jagged peaks of a mountain range. Beyond the boundaries of her
commons, past the ocean waves, lies land, and on that land appears to
be another world, another set of possibilities. Driven by whatever
need or interest, imperfectly defined and understood, she decides to
pursue this destination, planning the travel arrangements, thinking
through the journey. After she takes off for the new world, our
voyager notices that several fellow denizens are pursuing the same
dream. As the race continues, each traveler wants to arrive first,
unsure of what is in store for her on the new commons. When they
reach the new commons, many of the vexing problems from the old
world come back to haunt them, and the voyagers seek new solutions
and social arrangements to address familiar tensions.
219
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on this process and the grant of entitlements as a natural right
reveres the creative process of authorship that involves taking
materials from the common and incorporating pieces of works
from nature and the public domain to form a new work. Contrary
to the conventional wisdom expressed in copyright and literary
scholarship that the romantic author is an autonomous being who
creates alone, authors in reality create as an individual member of
society.222 Rights of access to literary and artistic works are a
reflection and affirmation of the rights of all authors in society to
create and be engaged in the process of authentic authorship. The
recognition of society’s rights to access literary and artistic works
for inspiration and the production of other forms of creative works
function to provide restraints on the rights of authors, because
authors, who produce works through the use of other forms of
existing works in the common, owe a moral and ethical obligation
to make their works available to other members of society in order
to serve the same purposes of encouraging authentic authorship in
other authors. The natural rights of society to access literary and
artistic works provide natural law restrictions on how property and
moral rights of authors may be exercised within a civil society.
Having identified the role of authors as being central in the
copyright system as well as the natural rights that they possess visà-vis the natural rights that other individuals within society possess
in relation to literary and artistic creations, the next part of this
Article, Part III, proceeds to discuss how these rights are arranged
within a society according to the social contract in order to achieve
fair and just distribution of entitlements.

Id. The intellectual commons as Professor Ghosh’s fable indicates is “about looking
outward, about exploring new horizons, and ultimately about expanding the existing
commons.” Id.
222
Yen, supra note 166, at 554. (“No author has lived an entire life on a proverbial
desert island. Instead, authors live and work as members of an artistic community and a
broader society whose creations, values and experiences form an integral part of the
author’s creative vision. Authorship is therefore not the creation of works which spring
like Athena from the head of Zeus, but the conscious and unconscious intake, digestion
and transformation of input gained from the author’s experience within a broader society.
Works of authorship therefore capture more than the author’s personality alone. They
capture a combination of the author’s personality, the society in which she lives, and the
works of other authors.”).
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III. COPYRIGHT CONTRACTARIANISM
Theories on the social contract stretch across a wide range of
individual beliefs about what a civil society and government
should look like. Contemporary political philosophy on the social
contract, perhaps most popularly identified in the writings of John
Rawls,223 suggests that a civil society predicated on notions of
justice and fairness can only exist if individuals within that society
agree upon certain standards and manners of behavior. In A
Theory of Justice, Rawls explains that the guiding idea in his
conception of the social contract is that the “principles of justice
for the basic structure of society are the object of the original
agreement. They are the principles that free and rational persons
concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial
position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their
association.”224 Earlier natural law writings by Thomas Hobbes,225
John Locke226 and John-Jacques Rousseau227 during the Age of

223
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (Harvard Univ. Press 1971) [hereinafter
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE].
224
Id.
225
Hobbes saw men as possessing certain natural rights and liberties that could be
transferred or renounced in consideration of a reciprocal right that is transferred to them
or for some other good they hoped to receive for their own benefit. Governments form
by way of institution when men agree collectively with each other to submit themselves
to an assembly of men or a government to represent and protect them, and they
collectively consent to conferring sovereign power to this institution. THOMAS HOBBES,
LEVIATHAN 228–29 (Penguin Classics 1985) (1651).
226
John Locke perceived men as being “free, equal and independent” in a state of
nature and only subject to political power by consent, which is done “by agreeing with
other Men, to joyn and unite into a Community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable
living one amongst another, in a secure Enjoyment of their Properties, and a greater
Security against any that are not of it.” LOCKE, supra note 179, bk. II, § 95. Locke goes
on to state that “[w]hen any number of men have so consented to make one Community or
Government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one Body Politick,
wherein the Majority have a Right to act and conclude the rest.” Id.
227
Rousseau believed that man’s transition from the state of nature to a civil state
“produces a very remarkable change in [him]”:
[B]y [its] substituting justice for instinct in his conduct, and giving
his actions the morality they had formerly lacked. Then only, when
the voice of duty takes the place of physical impulses and right of
appetite, does man, who so far had considered only himself, find that
he is forced to act on different principles, and to consult his reason
before listening to his inclinations.
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Enlightenment, when ideas of the rational individual acting on his
or her own best interests were assertively advanced as the basis for
which societies were formed, put forward a theoretical framework
that predicated democracy on a coherent political system where
individuals surrender their rights and liberties to a sovereign to rule
over them.
The social contract theories offer a fundamental theory about
individual, societal and governmental or state relations that
provides an important tool to deepen our understanding of the
copyright system and what the law aims to achieve through the
grant of statutory rights that create a temporary monopoly over
literary and artistic works for which society bears the cost.228 This
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 195 (Everyman
1993) (1762). Rousseau then adds:
What man loses by the social contract is his natural liberty and an
unlimited right to everything he tries to get and succeeds in getting;
what he gains is civil liberty and the proprietorship of all he
possesses. If we are to avoid mistake in weighing one against the
other, we must clearly distinguish natural liberty, which is bounded
only by the strength of the individual, from civil liberty, which is
limited by the general will; and possession, which is merely the effect
of force or the right of the first occupier, from property, which can be
founded only on a positive title.
Id. at 195–96.
228
The monopoly arises through the recognition of property rights over literary and
artistic works under the Copyright Act. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). Whether
the statutory grant and exclusive rights over creative works is really necessary for the
book printing business is debatable as a demonstration that initial publication costs are
high compared to the significantly lower reproduction costs of copyrighted works are
insufficient reasons to provide copyright protection. Other factors such as lead time
advantage, the threat of retaliation by the publisher and the existence of other ways of
sustaining a publisher’s revenue provide other incentives that may cast doubts on the
extent copyright is needed to provide an incentive for publication. See Stephen Breyer,
The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies and
Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 299–304 (1970). The social utility of
copyright is often a highly debatable matter and a quick response to Professor Breyer’s
article demonstrates the divided views on this issue. See generally Barry W. Tyerman,
The Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection for Published Books: A Reply to
Professor Breyer, 18 UCLA L. REV. 1100 (1971) (arguing that copyright provides an
efficient system to ensure authors have the financial and intellectual incentives to write
and that publishers are able to produce a wide variety of books for the public). Professor
Breyer replies and clarifies that his earlier article sets an analytical framework for
assessing the desirability for copyright protection for different forms of copyrighted
materials. See Stephen Breyer, Copyright: A Rejoinder, 20 UCLA L. REV. 75, 75 (1973).
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Article argues that copyright law ought to be about the
encouragement of authentic authorship by encouraging authors to
be creative in their production of literary and artistic works for the
public to benefit from. The law is much less about the publication,
dissemination or commercialization of creative works and more
about setting the optimum conditions in which authors and creators
are encouraged to produce these works that will appeal to and
benefit the public. The fundamental tenet of the social contract
theory—that individuals within society arrive at a mutually
beneficial agreement to be governed by a state authority, moral
norms or a theory of justice as fairness229—is a particularly
important philosophical idea to help us understand the historical
trajectory of copyright law that has led us to this point and to
provide us with a road map as to where we should head for the
future with copyright policies and law.
When applied to copyright jurisprudence, the social contract
theory helps us see clearly that the system that developed to
control the reproduction and dissemination of books as the printing
press emerged has produced a state in society in which
entitlements over literary and artistic works are seldom fairly or
justly settled and allocated. The constitutional clause promoting
the “Progress of Science and useful Arts”230 is a perceived
limitation on Congress’s intellectual property law-making power
that ought to subject intellectual property laws to the condition that
they “promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts,”231
thereby signifying that private entitlements over literary and
artistic works are indeed subject to some form of public consensus
Perhaps the most famous objection to overly extensive copyright protection in duration
was expressed by Sir Thomas Babington Macaulay in his speech before the House of
Commons by referring to copyright as a “tax on readers for the purpose of giving a
bounty to writers.” Macaulay, supra note 21.
229
See generally RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 223.
230
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
231
Id.; see Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of
Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L. J. 1771,
1810 (2006). Professor Oliar studied the intellectual property records from the Federal
Convention of 1787 and argues that the constitutional clause was intended by the Framers
to be a limitation on the kind of intellectual property laws that Congress could enact. Id.
If so, then intellectual property laws must be subjected to the condition that knowledge is
advanced and society improved. Id.
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that society should progress232 when intellectual property owners
are given rights over goods that are inherently public.233
A. Collective Agreement in Society
The underlying rationale for the grant of exclusive rights over
artistic works is to provide an author with the means of recovering
payment for the work by setting up a mechanism by which an
author’s readers may reward an author’s creative endeavors
through the free market.234 For this reason, an author is ultimately
beholden to the commercial marketplace as his or her patron, for it
is the author’s readers who will reward creative authorship through
the payment of royalties.235 The commercial market for literary
and artistic works is therefore an important institution to ensure
that authors and creators are connected to the public, the ultimate

232
“Progress” would involve an advancement or improvement in society. It would also
include the improvement of knowledge, the progress of civilization, the advancement of
human happiness, service and learning, the “general good of mankind,” and “the
cultivation and improvement of the human mind.” Id. at 1808.
233
Economists generally view information products as “public goods” that display two
characteristics. See Christopher Yoo, Copyright and Public Goods Economics: A
Misunderstood Relation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 637 (2007). First, public goods are
non-rivalrous, i.e., the consumption of the good by one person does not prevent the
consumption of the good by another. Id. Second, public goods are non-excludable, i.e.,
that it would be difficult for the owner of a public good to exclude some members of the
public from enjoying the goods. Id. However, because technology allows some works to
be excludable through technological protection measures, copyrighted materials are said
to be club goods; that is a form of public goods, that while non-rivalrous, are to some
extent excludable. See id. at 678–79.
234
Professor Paul Goldstein believes that authorship entails a direct communication
between authors and their intended audiences. Professor Goldstein states, “[c]opyright
sustains the very heart and essence of authorship by enabling this communication, this
connection. It is copyright that makes it possible for audiences—markets—to form for an
author’s work, and it is copyright that makes it possible for publishers to bring these
works to market.” Goldstein, supra note 20, at 302.
235
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503,
507 (1945) (“We do not expect that much of the literature and art which we desire can be
produced by men who possess independent means or who derive their living from other
occupations and make literature a by-product of their leisure hours. Support by the
government or by patrons on which authors used to depend, is today no good substitute
for royalties.”).
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beneficiaries of an author’s creativity and work.236 Besides
ensuring authorship and the production, publication and
distribution of literary and artistic works, the market also serves to
compel authors to write for and appeal to the widest segment of
society as authors begin viewing the public as their patron. The
public provides market demand that inclines authors and creators
to write for the masses, as the most widely received and accepted
works provide authors and creators with the guarantee of authorial
success.237 Through the grant of property rights over literary and
artistic works as incentives for creation, owners of copyright
become entitled to internalize and appropriate benefits that accrue
to the public from the availability of the work on the market.238 As
it is difficult to ascertain with absolute certainty the true social
value of intellectual property,239 copyright owners may be inclined
236
The market participants conventionally are comprised by authors or creators,
copyright users (new authors and pirates) and consumers. See RICHARD WATT,
COPYRIGHT AND ECONOMIC THEORY: FRIENDS OR FOE? 8 (Edward Elgar 2000) (1963).
237
Augustine Birrell points out that highly popular authors and creators are most likely
to reap rich pecuniary rewards from the public:
To gain and retain the ear of this public even for a decade, to tickle
their fancy, to win their confidence, is (to a prolific writer) to make a
fortune. . . . Half-a-dozen really popular novels . . . a couple of
successful long-running plays, will put their authors in possession of
a sum of money more than equalling in amount to the slow
accumulations of thirty years of a laborious and successful
professional life.
BIRRELL, supra note 140, at 196.
238
This is done through the copyright owner’s right to prevent others from making
copies. The social costs of reduced access to these works are offset by the incentives
provided to create the work in the first place. This balance between access and incentives
is the central concern in copyright law. To achieve economic efficiency, copyright
doctrines must maximize the benefits from the incentive to create while balancing the
losses from reduced access and the administration of copyright protection. See William
Landes & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD.
325, 326 (1989). For a more recent discussion on recovering the fixed cost of producing
copyrighted works from society, see Richard Posner, Intellectual Property: The Law and
Economics Approach, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 57 (2005).
239
The difficulty in valuing copyrighted works stems from a lack of standard evaluation
criteria that can be applied to all works to set one work apart from another. Any form of
authorship will undoubtedly be socially valuable by contributing to “the Progress of
Science and useful Arts.” U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. However, any criteria developed
to value a work will be subject to an individual evaluator’s personal assessment.
Professor Jane Ginsburg speaks of this difficulty in evaluating works for different levels
of creativity in compilations and works of information. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation
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to price literary and artistic works beyond the marginal price of
production, known as rent seeking, of which society bears the costs
of this restricted access to particular creative works240 unless
acceptable substitutes for the particular work are available.241
Markets, however, do not operate with the constraints of
morality that are so important in the copyright system to ensure
access to literary and artistic works for new authors and to
safeguard society’s interest in pursuing knowledge and excellence
through the availability of literary and artistic works. As David
Gauthier explains, “[i]n leaving each person free to pursue her
interest in her own way, the market satisfies the ideal of moral
anarchy” where individuals live within a society that knows no
“deeper artifice of morality.”242 However, as Professor Gauthier
rightfully points out, the “world is not a market” and “morality is a
necessary constraint on the interaction of rational persons,”243
particularly when this interaction of rational persons involves the
exchange of entitlements over intangibles such as literary and
artistic works, an exchange which general function in society is to
serve an inherently moral purpose of allowing individuals to
pursue knowledge and excellence, and encouraging authors to
engage in authentic forms of creative authorship.

and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 1865, 1899–1900 (1990).
240
In intellectual property law, many of the issues, the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act, patent reform and database protection being some of them, are highly contested
among many conflicting interests. See Mark Lemley, The Constitutionalization of
Technology Law, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 529, 532 (2000). Strong interest groups push
for certain agendas and Congress may respond favorably to certain interest groups and
overlook the interests of the general public. See id.
241
The copyright market is actually a market where substitutes abound, quite unlike the
market for patents, where property rights in patents may confer a large market share that
may present entry barriers. The copyright market for literary and artistic works is
different. One author’s expression is easily substitutable for another author’s. This is
probably because of the idea/expression distinction in copyright that makes ideas not
copyrightable and allows them to be incorporated in other works. See Goldstein, supra
note 20, at 84.
242
DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT 84 (Oxford Univ. Press 1986).
243
Id.
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In the present copyright market, where the internalization of
external benefits is one of the main functions of property rights244
and free-market exchange becomes impossible as property owners
hold out from disclosing the true value of their property,245
cooperation among all parties within the copyright system for the
benefit of society is unlikely to occur. Intellectual property
scholars have pointed out the dangers of allowing complete
internalization of social benefits through the extension of property
rights,246 recognizing that free-riding is a natural and desirable
consequence of industrial spillovers that contribute towards
industrial innovativeness and social growth and development.247
Many scholars have also argued that the attempt by copyright
owners to recover all external benefits through copyright has a
detrimental effect upon society248 and that the public’s right to
244
Harold Demsetz, Towards a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347,
350 (1967).
245
See Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106–07 (1972).
246
Some of the effects of extending intellectual property to allow for the internalization
of externalities are the creation of deadweight losses that will have an adverse effect on a
competitive market, the interference with another’s ability to create, rent seeking
behavior by rights owners, and the high administrative costs that will arise from the
enforcement of these rights. Lemley, Property, supra note 29, at 1058–59.
247
Free-riding by society drives innovation and industries with greater spillovers to
develop more innovation than industries with fewer spillovers. See Brett Frischmann &
Mark Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 259–60 (2007).
248
Professor Lawrence Lessig, for example, argues that technology in the form of code
provides copyright owners almost perfect control over the distribution and use of content.
See LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 213, at 22–23, 147. This form of control
diminishes the vast potential for innovation on the Internet. See id. Professor Lessig also
argues that the expansion of intellectual property provides large media conglomerates the
ability to affect how ordinary citizens live their everyday lives by preventing the
development of new and more efficient technologies. See LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra
note 213, at 162. Professor Jessica Litman argues that the public interest was not a
consideration in the drafting of 1976 Copyright Act. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL
COPYRIGHT 71–74 (Prometheus Books 2001). The Act was drafted by representatives of
copyright businesses with the public interest unrepresented in the legislative process. See
id. The effect of the Copyright Act is the forced compliance of the public to a law that
they do not understand. Id. Professor Siva Vaidhyanathan argues that the Government’s
1995 White Paper, which confirmed the application of copyright to cyberspace, did not
consider the public interest as a factor in setting a fair copyright balance. SIVA
VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 159–60 (N.Y. Univ. Press 2001). As a result,
copyright owners gained more power to control, private interests prevailed over the
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access literary and artistic works should prevail as soon as
copyright owners recover the costs of production and
dissemination through the rights provided.249 A vibrant public
domain is necessary for creativity,250 and allowing all forms of
external benefits to be captured through excessive claims of
property rights over creative works would have the effect of
enclosing the common pool of creative resources open to all for
public use.251 The balance that copyright law must strike between
providing rights as incentives to create and providing public access
to creative materials to promote democratic civil discourse within
the public252 allows the free flow of culture in society253 and
ensures that economic growth and wealth distribution in a
public, media conglomerates exerted influence on global copyright policy making and
technology allowed copyright owners to prevent the public from getting access to their
works. Id. Professor Wendy Gordon criticizes the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act
as having very little effect on the creativity of present authors and instead having negative
effects upon creative people, who require access to existing works for inspiration in
expression. Wendy Gordon, Authors, Publishers, and Public Goods: Trading Gold for
Dross, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 159, 187 (2003).
249
If copyright’s primary purpose is to encourage authors to write and produce creative
works, then these works should be placed in the public as soon as the law’s purposes
have been met. See John M. Garon, Media & Monopoly in the Information Age: Slowing
the Convergence at the Marketplace of Ideas, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 491, 512–
13 (1999). Also consider the judgment of Justice Stewart in Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. Aiken, where he states, “[c]reative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but
private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability
of literature, music, and the other arts.” Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422
U.S. 151, 156 (1975). Chief Justice Hughes expressed a similar opinion when he stated
that the “sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the
monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.”
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932). Justice Douglas, citing Chief Justice
Hughes, also stated the same opinion in his judgment: “[t]he copyright law, like the
patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration. . . . [T]he reward
to the author or artist serves to induce release to the public of the products of his creative
genius.” United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948).
250
Professor Jessica Litman argues that the public domain provides the raw materials
necessary for authorship to occur. See Litman, The Public Domain, supra note 65, at 965.
Copyright is based on the idea of originality but most authors rely upon existing works to
create new ones and are seldom inspired to independently create a completely new work.
Id. at 968. The public domain offers authors a vast source of creative resources by
reserving non-copyrightable materials to the commons. Id. at 975.
251
James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public
Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003).
252
See generally Netanel, Copyright, supra note 20.
253
See generally Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257 (2006).
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country’s development process occurs.254 Achieving this balance
in the copyright system necessitates a collective agreement among
all parties to the copyright system to ensure that each party acts in
the interests of society as a whole within the boundaries of their
legal entitlements.
In this situation, a circumstance for justice, described by
Professor Rawls as “the normal conditions under which human
cooperation is both possible and necessary,” arises as “social
cooperation makes possible a better life for all than any would
have if each were to try to live solely by his efforts.”255 Rawls
identifies two conditions that give rise to the conditions for
justice—an objective circumstance that makes human cooperation
both possible and necessary and a subjective circumstance that
reflects the different plans for life as well as the diversity of
philosophical and religious beliefs and political and social
doctrines that reflects the needs and interests of the subjects of
cooperation.256 These two conditions, present in the copyright
system, raise the circumstances for justice that make cooperation
among all parties to the copyright system both possible and
necessary.
B. Copyright and the State of Nature/Original Position
Rawls’ conception of justice as fairness begins with the
principles of justice as the object of the original agreement for
cooperation.257 These principles of justice are “those which
rational persons concerned to advance their interests would accept
in this position of equality to settle the basic terms of their
association.”258 In order to achieve this, “one must establish that,
given the circumstances of the parties, and their knowledge,
beliefs, and interests, an agreement on these principles is the best
way for each person to secure his ends in view of the alternatives

254
See generally Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 2821 (2006).
255
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 223, at 126–27.
256
Id.
257
Id.
258
Id. at 118–19.
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available.”259 This agreement for cooperation begins at the
original position as a purely hypothetical status quo where any
agreements reached among the parties will be fair for the original
position as “a state of affairs in which the parties are equally
represented as moral persons and the outcome is not conditioned
by arbitrary contingencies or the relative balance of social
forces.”260 To achieve procedural fairness, Rawls stipulates that
this agreement must be made behind a veil of ignorance:
[where] no one knows his place in society, his class
position or social status . . . his fortune in the
distribution of natural assets and abilities, his
intelligence [and] strength . . . [or] his conception of
the good, the particulars of his rational plan of life,
or even the special features of his psychology such
as his aversion to risk or liability to optimism or
pessimism. More than this . . . the parties do not
know the particular circumstances of their own
society . . . its economic or political situation, or the
level of civilization and culture it has been able to
achieve.261
In the copyright system, the original position in which an
agreement for cooperation according to the principles of justice as
fairness wherein all parties to the copyright system—authors,
readers and publishers/distributors—may secure their best interest
in light of the alternatives available is therefore the position where
all parties, not knowing the particular circumstances of the present
copyright society, would agree to conduct their affairs and
activities in a manner that achieves justice among all the parties
involved.
This means that authors, readers and
publishers/distributors must agree to cooperate in a just distribution
of entitlements in literary and artistic works to ensure the mutual
benefit of all, which requires certain moral or ethical restraints on
the exercise of rights in literary and artistic works according to
what is just to all parties.

259
260
261

Id. at 119.
Id. at 120.
Id. at 137.
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C. Justice and Fairness in the Copyright System
A conception of justice in the copyright system according to
the social contract theory provides a guiding framework to subject
the exercise of rights and allocation of entitlements in literary and
artistic works to moral and ethical judgment. A utilitarian-based
system lacks the capacity to make value judgments to help us
assess the fairness of particular positions taken by Congress, the
courts and parties to the copyright system. From the perspective of
a pure utilitarian, the extension of the copyright term and property
rights over literary and artistic works, for example, is an acceptable
way to protect the economic interests of copyright owners by
ensuring that investments made in producing works are protected
and that works are continually exploited in accordance to the
statutory rights that the law recognizes. From a justice and fairness
perspective of the social contract, this would be morally and
ethically wrong because resources for society’s use are kept away
from the reach of the public. The agreement that all parties within
the copyright system cooperate to achieve the best interests of all
parties is violated if the public is denied access to creative works
that are needed for other forms of creative production and
authentic authorship. Conversely, the violation of an author’s
moral rights by subjecting the work to derogatory treatment against
the artistic vision of the author also violates the social contract, for
the best interest of the author is undermined when respect for his
authentic expression through creative authorship is not duly given.
These value judgments and ethical assessments will not be possible
without the recognition of a cohesive social agreement among all
parties to the copyright system to cooperate and act in each other’s
best interests.
D. Role of the Judiciary
The judiciary’s role so far has been to defer to congressional
wisdom on matters of intellectual property policy.262 Changing the
philosophical foundation of the copyright system and embracing
262

See Paul Schwartz & William Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright Term
Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 2331,
2334 (2003).
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the concept of a social contract among all parties to the copyright
system allows for greater judicial power to make moral and ethical
assessments on principles of justice and fairness in a way that
would enhance the role of the copyright system to encourage
authentic authorship and the creation of literary and artistic works
that would ultimately be of value and benefit to society. Judges
would also be able to take a more proactive role in defining the
rights and obligations of all parties to the copyright system based
on their natural rights and moral and ethical obligations to each
other without being bound by the statutory provisions of the
Copyright Act.
CONCLUSION
A utilitarian-based copyright system, while aiming to increase
social welfare by granting property rights in literary and artistic
works, has thus far produced a market for literary and artistic
works that does not necessarily encourage authentic authorship and
the creation of works that serves to ultimately benefit society. The
system has created an environment which facilitates the production
of works that will be successfully commercialized on the market
but which appears to operate to the benefit of copyright owners
most of all. Authors and their readers are not the primary
beneficiaries of the present copyright system, which seems to be
functioning as a legal system that protects the interests of
economic investors in the production of creative works more than
the interests of the author and the public. By recognizing that there
are both natural rights which authors acquire and possess by virtue
of their labor and personality, and natural rights that society has to
pursue knowledge and excellence through literary and artistic
works, the copyright system may approach the allocation of
entitlements and the recognition of rights in works on a principle
of justice that promotes fairness among all parties to the copyright
system.
Professor Patterson and Stanley Lindberg remind us that the
copyright system is comprised of three parties with legitimate and
valid interests in literary and artistic works. It would be a mistake
for the law to emphasize the rights of any one party without
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considering the effect of that emphasis on the rights and
entitlements of the other two parties. By acknowledging a social
contract among all parties to the copyright system, we will be
reminded that all three parties are a necessary and vital component
to ensuring authentic authorship for the benefit of society as a
whole. As it is aptly stated by Professor Patterson and Stanley
Lindberg:
Traditionally viewed as a law for authors and
artists, copyright was actually originated by
publishers and has a long history of having
benefited entrepreneurs much more than creators.
A major purpose of this book, [The Nature of
Copyright], is to explain the vagaries of history that
caused this anomaly and thus to justify a new—and
long overdue—perspective of copyright law:
copyright as a law for consumers as well as for
creators or marketers. All three of these groups—
authors, publishers (or other entrepreneurs), and
customers—are users of copyrighted materials,
which is why the copyright law consists of three
parts: a law of author’s rights, a law of publishers’
rights and a law of users’ rights.263
A comprehensive theory of copyright law ought to account for
these three interests in its jurisprudence. The present utilitarianbased copyright system does not account for all three interests. By
evaluating the copyright system from a natural law/natural rights
contractarian perspective, all three interests may be accounted for
to enable the law to allocate entitlements in literary and artistic
works in accordance to principles of justice and fairness so that
authentic authorship may occur for the benefit of society.

263

PATTERSON & LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT, supra note 164, at 3–4.

